The Effects of Language and Geography-Defined Groups on Health Insurance Choice by Blavin, Fredric E
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
Summer 8-12-2011
The Effects of Language and Geography-Defined
Groups on Health Insurance Choice
Fredric E. Blavin
University of Pennsylvania, fblavin@wharton.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, Health Economics Commons, Health Policy
Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the Public Policy Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/367
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Blavin, Fredric E., "The Effects of Language and Geography-Defined Groups on Health Insurance Choice" (2011). Publicly Accessible
Penn Dissertations. 367.
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/367
The Effects of Language and Geography-Defined Groups on Health
Insurance Choice
Abstract
The objective of this study is to measure how language and geography-defined groups influence participation
in public health insurance programs. The theoretical model in this paper shows how better information on
insurance states, gleaned through language group contacts in one’s local area, can help individuals decide
whether or not to take up a public benefit or remain uninsured. This study focuses on Medicaid-eligible adults
and Medicaid/CHIP-eligible children who speak a non-English language at home, and uses pooled cross-
sections of the 2008-2009 American Community Survey (ACS). Adapting an empirical method developed by
Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000), I define the main variable of interest as the interaction between
contact availability, the density of an individual’s language group in an individual’s local area, and group quality,
the information and preferences related to Medicaid that an individual’s language group may possess, as
measured by the language group’s Medicaid take-up rate. The empirical framework also uses language group
and Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) fixed effects to control for observable and unobservable differences
across language groups and local areas. The main results and sensitivity analyses strongly suggest that language
and geography groups have a statistically significant impact on an individual’s probability of taking-up
Medicaid/CHIP: For a policy change that increases Medicaid use by 1 percentage point, the network for these
language groups will increase the probability of taking-up Medicaid by 10 percentage points for adults and 7
percentage points for children. As eligibility expands under the Affordable Care Act and more people in a
given language group enroll in Medicaid/CHIP, the multiplier effect could lead to higher overall program
participation than might otherwise might be anticipated in a scenario without non-market interactions. These
results can also help policymakers target outreach funds towards uninsured non-English speakers who are
eligible for public benefits.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Healthcare Systems
First Advisor
Mark V. Pauly
Keywords
Medicaid, health economics, health policy, language groups, networks, geography
Subject Categories
Behavioral Economics | Health Economics | Health Policy | Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation | Public
Policy
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/367
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/367
  
 
THE EFFECTS OF LANGUAGE AND GEOGRAPHY-DEFINED GROUPS ON HEALTH 
INSURANCE CHOICE 
 
Fredric E. Blavin 
 
A DISSERTATION  
In 
Healthcare Management and Economics 
 
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
in  
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2011 
 
Supervisor of Dissertation 
Signature      
Mark V. Pauly, Bendheim Professor of Health Care Management 
 
Graduate Group Chairperson 
Signature      
Eric T. Bradlow, K.P. Chao Professor of Marketing, Statistics, and Education 
 
Dissertation Committee 
Scott Harrington, Ph.D., Alan B. Miller Professor of Health Care Management 
Guy David, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Health Care Management 
Jeremy Tobacman, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Business and Public Policy  
  
 
The Effects of Language and Geography-Defined Groups on Health Insurance Choice 
COPYRIGHT 
2011 
Fredric Evan Blavin
 iii 
DEDICATION 
 
I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Susan, and parents, Harvey and Judy, for their 
unconditional love, support, and patience.   
 
 iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
I would like to thank Mark Pauly, Scott Harrington, Guy David, and Jeremy Tobacman for their 
mentorship and insightful comments.  I would also like to thank Steve Bednar, Melinda Beeuwkes 
Buntin, Linda Blumberg, Joanne Levy, Sean McElligott, John Holahan, Genevieve Kenney, 
Stacey McMorrow, Michael Morrissey, Andrew Mulcahy, Amol Navathe, Andrea Puig, Kenneth 
Reynolds, and David Rothschild for their feedback and support.
 v 
ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF LANGUAGE AND GEOGRAPHY-DEFINED GROUPS ON HEALTH 
INSURANCE CHOICE 
Fredric E. Blavin 
Mark V. Pauly 
The objective of this study is to measure how language and geography-defined groups influence 
participation in public health insurance programs.  The theoretical model in this paper shows how 
better information on insurance states, gleaned through language group contacts in one’s local 
area, can help individuals decide whether or not to take up a public benefit or remain uninsured. 
This study focuses on Medicaid-eligible adults and Medicaid/CHIP-eligible children who speak a 
non-English language at home, and uses pooled cross-sections of the 2008-2009 American 
Community Survey (ACS).  Adapting an empirical method developed by Bertrand, Luttmer, and 
Mullainathan (2000), I define the main variable of interest as the interaction between contact 
availability, the density of an individual’s language group in an individual’s local area, and group 
quality, the information and preferences related to Medicaid that an individual’s language group 
may possess, as measured by the language group’s Medicaid take-up rate.  The empirical 
framework also uses language group and Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) fixed effects to 
control for observable and unobservable differences across language groups and local areas.  
The main results and sensitivity analyses strongly suggest that language and geography groups 
have a statistically significant impact on an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid/CHIP: 
For a policy change that increases Medicaid use by 1 percentage point, the network for these 
language groups will increase the probability of taking-up Medicaid by 10 percentage points for 
adults and 7 percentage points for children.  As eligibility expands under the Affordable Care Act 
and more people in a given language group enroll in Medicaid/CHIP, the multiplier effect could 
lead to higher overall program participation than might otherwise might be anticipated in a 
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scenario without non-market interactions.  These results can also help policymakers target 
outreach funds towards uninsured non-English speakers who are eligible for public benefits.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.A Research Objective 
 Empirical evidence strongly suggests that targeted efforts to increase Medicaid 
or Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) participation reduce ambulatory care 
sensitive hospital admissions among children (Aizer 2003).  In addition, compared to the 
uninsured, children enrolled in Medicaid are more likely to have a usual source of care 
outside of the emergency room, less likely to have unmet or delayed health needs, are 
more satisfied with the care they receive, and are more likely to utilize preventive 
health and dental care (Dubay and Kenney 2001).  However, despite these potential 
benefits and low cost-sharing levels from the enrollees perspective, millions of low-
income uninsured children and adults are eligible for Medicaid/CHIP coverage.  
According to the 2009 American Community Survey (ACS), approximately 19% of 
uninsured adults (39.9 million) and 71% of uninsured children (7.1 million) are income 
eligible for Medicaid/CHIP coverage through either mandatory “categorically needy” or 
optional “categorically related” pathways.1    
While the majority of the literature attributes low take-up rates to lack of 
information (e.g., not knowing about program eligibility), low perceived benefits 
                                                          
1
 These are approximations and do not include all of the Medicaid eligibility pathways. For example, they 
do not incorporate citizenship criteria or health/disability status.  These issues will be further addressed in 
the paper. 
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associated with participation, and administrative and policy design complexities (Remler 
and Glied 2003), there is a growing interest in the role of “social networks” in potentially 
reducing the costs of participation (Bertrand, Luttmer, Mullainathan 2000; Aizer and 
Currie 2004).  Using economic theory, a new data source, and well-established empirical 
methods, this is the first study to measure the effects of “networks”, defined by 
language group behavior and geographic location, on individual health insurance take-
up decisions.   
Researchers in sociology and economics tend to use the terms “social networks”, 
“social interactions”, “peer effects”, and “neighborhood effects”, interchangeably.  In its 
simplest form, social interactions are defined as direct non-market interactions between 
individuals that can potentially influence individual choices and economic outcomes 
such as use of physician services (Moffitt 2001; Pauly and Satterthwaite 1981).  In this 
study, social interactions, such as conversations between friends related to Medicaid 
benefits, are unobservable to the researcher, whereas networks, defined by the agents 
for whom individuals rely upon for social interactions, are defined with available data 
sources.  For the purpose of this study, the concept of networks is defined very broadly 
and provides a noisy signal about social interactions, but the application is specific to 
language-geography groups. 
Focusing on the low-income, Medicaid-eligible population, this study uses non-
English language spoken at home and geographic location to proxy for the social links 
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between individuals and explores if there is a causal effect of language group behavior 
on an individual’s probability of taking-up seemingly free Medicaid/CHIP benefits 
relative to being uninsured. Borrowing from Bertrand et al. (2000), the main variable of 
interest in this paper is defined as the interaction between contact availability, the 
density of an individual’s language group in an individual’s local area, and group quality, 
the information related to Medicaid/CHIP that an individual’s language group may 
possess, as measured by the language group’s Medicaid take-up rate.  A simple example 
demonstrates this approach.  For an individual that is part of a high Medicaid/CHIP take-
up language group (e.g., above the mean), living among a high concentration of his/her 
language group can increase the person’s probability of taking-up Medicaid.  For 
example, suppose a Cantonese speaker migrates to the U.S. and lives in an area that his 
heavily concentrated with other Cantonese speakers.  Because Cantonese speakers in 
the U.S. as a whole have a high Medicaid take-up rate, these potential contacts in the 
local area can provide information related to the benefits of enrollment relative to being 
uninsured.   In contrast, for those, such as Koreans, that are part of a low take-up group 
(e.g., below the mean), living among a high concentration of the language group can 
decrease the person’s probability of taking-up Medicaid relative to living among a low 
concentration of the language group.  These potential contacts might believe that costs 
of enrollment outweigh the benefits  (e.g., it is more convenient to remain uninsured 
and utilize necessary care from safety net providers), and could discourage the 
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individual from enrolling.  It is also possible that living among a high concentration of 
the language group increases the probability of take-up, regardless if the person is from 
a low or high take-up group.  However, the differential effect on the probability of take-
up will be larger among those that are part of a high take-up group, as these groups 
might possess more practical knowledge (e.g., information related to eligibility and 
necessary documentation) that could help the individual enroll in Medicaid.  In other 
words, the main question for this study is as follows:  What is the differential effect  
(between low and high take-up language groups) of living in areas of high concentration 
of a common language group on an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid?   
 
While language groups could influence the decision to obtain private health 
insurance, this paper does not focus on this outcome for two main reasons.  First, 
networks could only indirectly influence rates of employer-sponsored health insurance 
(ESI) through labor market decisions, and several other studies have already measured 
network effects in the labor group (e.g., Ioannides and Loury 2004). Earlier versions of 
this paper tested the same methodology with ESI instead of Medicaid, but did not find 
any statistically significant results.  Second, language group behavior could potentially 
influence decisions in the individual non-group market by reducing search costs and 
spreading information.  However, the proportion of non-group enrollees that speak a 
non-English language is relatively small, and ACS does not contain sufficient information 
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(e.g, ESI offer information) to determine eligibility for the individual non-group market.  
As such, the main independent variable of interest would capture unobservable 
characteristics that influence an individual’s likelihood of searching for coverage in the 
individual non-group market.   
This question is relevant for several reasons.  First, Medicaid eligibility and 
language spoken at home are important; the number of adult and children who speak a 
language other than English at home has substantially increased over the past few 
decades (U.S. Census Bureau and American Community Survey, 1979-2008).  Currently, 
approximately 12% of adults are eligible for Medicaid, 26% of whom speak a non-English 
language at home, and 50% of children are eligible for Medicaid/CHIP, 32% of whom 
have a mother who speaks a non-English language at home.2   Demographics are 
shifting, and those who speak a non-English language at home have different behavioral 
patterns and experience different outcomes than English-speakers; for instance, 
children without English-speaking parents are less likely to take-up Medicaid/CHIP 
relative to children with English-speaking parents (Kenney et al. 2010).  
Second, sociological research suggests that people who speak a non-English 
language at home interact mainly with others who speak that language, and are more 
closely linked than individuals who merely share the same ethnic background (Alba 
                                                          
2
 Author’s tabulation of the 2009 ACS.  Medicaid eligibility is determined by state income thresholds.  See 
chapter 4 for more details. 
 6 
 
 
 
1990; Lazear 1995).  For example, several studies explored the impact of racial and 
ethnic group behavior on individual outcomes, but given high levels of variation within 
racial and ethnic groups as opposed to across groups (e.g., as a group, Asians might 
behavior similarly to Whites, but there is considerable variation among Asians who 
speak Japanese, Hmong, Cambodian, Hindi, etc…), it is very difficult to come up with 
accurate theoretical predictions and empirical estimates.  This is consistent with the fact 
that on the ACS, Cantonese adults and children have relatively high take-up rates, 
whereas Korean adults and children have some of the lowest take-up rates. Similarly, 
immigrant populations may lack knowledge about the U.S. health care system and could 
be more likely to rely on those who speak a common non-English language for 
information related to Medicaid benefits.  Characteristics of health care systems, such 
as levels of out-of-pocket spending and the efficacy of government financing, vary 
across countries of birth and can create similar levels of information or attitudes 
towards government-sponsored health insurance programs such as Medicaid/CHIP 
within a given language group.   This study primarily focuses on language groups, but 
also explores the strength of country of birth networks. 
Third, there is considerable variation in Medicaid/CHIP participation both across 
and within states (Kenney et al. 2010) and geography can play an important role in 
determining the strength of a language group’s network effect.  This is one of the first 
studies to utilize the new health insurance coverage questions (added in 2008) on the 
 7 
 
 
 
American Community Survey (ACS).  The ACS is a particularly rich survey because it also 
includes identifiers for public use microdata area (PUMA) of residence, which are 
geographic units within states that contain at least 100,000 people, and more 
aggregated residence measures such as super-PUMAs (areas of 400,000 people) and 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).  No other major surveys that produce health 
insurance estimates, such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS), or Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), contain such 
detailed geographic identifiers.  The ACS also contains identifiers for language spoken at 
home, citizenship status, country of birth, and other socio-demographic characteristics 
that can help identify and determine the strength of network effects.  Because of these 
unique variables, along with the fact that each ACS cross-section contains more than 3 
million individuals, I can directly control for language groups and local areas 
characteristics. 
Fourth, there are timely policy implications associated with this study.  Effective 
January 1, 2014, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) expands Medicaid eligibility so that 
states must cover adult citizens up to 138 percent of federal poverty level (FPL), 
primarily affecting non-parents who are currently ineligible.  This portion of the ACA 
could have a large impact on the majority of states, as only 11 states have eligibility 
thresholds for parents exceeding 133 percent FPL and more than half of states do not 
provide Medicaid coverage for childless adults (Artiga, 2009). Even though the number 
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of uninsured is projected to decrease by 32 million, 23 million residents are predicted to 
remain uninsured by 2019, including those who are eligible for Medicaid but do not 
take-up the benefits (CBO, 2010).  Language groups could play an important role in 
influencing take-up, as over 2 million newly eligible adults speaks a non-English language 
at home.3   Additionally, a top Obama administration priority is to ensure that uninsured 
children are enrolled in Medicaid or the CHIP program (Sebelius 2010); as part of the 
CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2009, $100 million dollars were allocated to outreach and 
enrollment activities.  The results from this study could assist states in developing 
practical policy tools, such as direct advertising campaigns, aimed at these groups could 
affect individual behavior directly and indirectly through a network multiplier-type 
effect.   
Finally, this paper is motivated by the theoretical and empirical challenges 
associated with measuring the causal effects of group behavior on individual economic 
outcomes.  The framework aims to convince the reader that language-geography 
defined groups have a causal impact on an individual’s probability of taking-up 
Medicaid.  This framework unambiguously predicts that an exogenous increase in 
Medicaid take-up (e.g., improved outreach efforts through the ACA) will increase the 
individual’s probability of take-up, but more so for those that live in high contact 
availability areas.  Holding all else constant, however, an exogenous increase in contact 
                                                          
3
 Author’s tabulation of the 2009 ACS. 
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availability of an individual’s language group will have an ambiguous effect on an 
individual’s probability of take-up.     
1.B Roadmap  
 Chapter 2 gives a review of the existing literature, describes the Medicaid take-
up process, and elucidates the key contributions of this study.  Few studies explore the 
role of networks in influencing health insurance choice and none focus on 
Medicaid/CHIP take-up as an outcome or language-geography as the measure of 
networks.  The first part of this chapter (2.A) reviews the literature related to the take-
up of government benefits with a focus on Medicaid and CHIP.   As a whole, these 
studies show that take-up rates vary considerably by income levels, expansion or 
eligibility type, geography, and other individual or family characteristics.   As mentioned 
in 1.A, the reasons for not taking-up Medicaid/CHIP also vary.  This study expands on 
this literature by providing new take-up estimates using the ACS (overall and by 
language group) and exploring how language and geography can impact an individual’s 
probability of taking-up benefits.  The second part of this chapter (2.B) reviews the 
theoretical and empirical research related to networks and economic outcomes.  The 
theoretical literature shows that networks influence individual economic outcomes 
through the spread of information, social learning, imitation, and stigma reduction via 
the spread of social norms.  The empirical literature explores a wide range of outcomes 
and empirical methods, with the former ranging from crime to earnings to obesity, and 
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the latter ranging from experiments to instrumental variables to fixed effects models.  
Given the wide variety of studies, this section will primarily focus on the papers with 
similar outcome variables (e.g., health insurance choice or the take-up of government 
benefits), network definitions such as language and race/ethnicity, and empirical 
methods. 
I develop a formal expected utility maximization model in Chapter 3 to better 
understand the mechanisms by which language and geography influence health 
insurance outcomes.  In this model, individuals face the choice of taking-up 
Medicaid/CHIP benefits or being uninsured.  The model incorporates the expected 
private utility and a multiplicative network utility associated with each choice that 
illustrates how networks provides information on a language group’s common tastes, 
knowledge related to health care options, and valuation of Medicaid benefits relative to 
being uninsured.   The model predicts that an increase in a language group’s Medicaid 
take-up rate is associated with an increase in the individual’s probability of take-up, 
whereas an increase in a language group’s uninsurance rate is associated with an 
increase in the individual’s probability of being uninsured.   An increase in contact 
availability has an ambiguous effect on an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid 
and depends on the difference in magnitude of the total utility associated with Medicaid 
take-up relative to being uninsured; living in a high CA area could increase the 
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probability of take-up among high take-up groups, whereas the opposite may be true 
among low take-up groups. 
The major empirical challenge associated with this study is to properly identify 
the causal effect of one’s language-geography network on health insurance outcomes. 
While it is easy for researchers to find correlations between individual outcomes and 
mean language group or neighborhood outcomes, it is much more challenging to 
demonstrate that networks have a causal effect on individual behavior.  As a simple 
illustration, I ran two “naïve” OLS models, where the dependent variable is a 0/1 
indicator for taking-up Medicaid, and the main network variables were either the mean 
Medicaid rate within language groups (language group effects) or the mean Medicaid 
rate within PUMAs (neighborhood effects).  Even after controlling for individual and 
household-level characteristics, the coefficient on these network variables range from 
.70 to .95 depending on the model.  These coefficients are statistically significant at the 
1 percent level, but do not provide a causal estimate of network effects; they are merely 
correlations that may be attributable to unobservable individual, neighborhood, or 
language group characteristics.  These correlations can be characterized as the 
“reflection problem”, where individual behavior determines group behavior, and not 
vice versa (Manski 1993).   
However, additional omitted variable biases could remain.  For example, it is 
possible that differential geographic sorting among individuals or outreach efforts that 
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are correlated with the main variable of interest could be also explain the main results 
from this paper. Chapter 4 further describes these omitted variable biases and 
identification issues (4.A) and presents the data sources (4.B) and empirical framework 
(4.C) used to address these challenges.  Chapter 4.B describes the data and the 
development of the core and expanded samples.  There are two core samples:  
Medicaid eligible adults (19-64) who speak a language other than English at home and 
Medicaid/CHIP eligible children who live in a non-English household (defined by the 
mother’s language).  Both samples exclude individuals with private or other public 
health insurance.  The expanded sample analyses include those with private health 
insurance and are more theoretically sound because some individuals face multiple 
health insurance choices.  However, the results in the core sample are easier to 
interpret and are consistent with the results from the expanded sample.  Chapter 4.C 
describes the empirical models, inspired by Bertand et al. (2000) who created a unique 
measure of language-geography networks in the context of welfare use and used 
language group and local area fixed effects to control for unobservable language group 
and local area characteristics, respectively.  This study primarily uses linear probability 
models4 where the dependent variable is a 0/1 indicator for Medicaid take-up (core 
sample) or being insured (expanded sample).  I also explore multinomial logit models 
with the expanded sample where Medicaid, any private health insurance, or being 
                                                          
4
 I also use logit and probit models as specification checks. 
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uninsured are the three choice outcomes for the dependent variable.  This chapter also 
describes multiple sensitivity and sub-sample analyses associated with the main model, 
including the use of local area characteristics instead of fixed effects and interactions of 
these characteristics with the network variable. 
The results from this dissertation reveal that language-geography defined 
networks have a strong impact on the probability that an individual takes-up 
Medicaid/CHIP benefits.  Chapter 5 presents the core sample, expanded sample, and 
sensitivity analyses for adults and children.  The regression coefficient on the main 
network variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all of the main 
models and remains robust across the vast majority of the sensitivity analyses.  
Interpretation of these coefficients, especially in the multinomial logit model, is not 
straightforward because the key independent variable is an interaction term between 
two continuous variables.  The most intuitive way to interpret the network coefficient is 
to view it as a policy multiplier effect:   The core model results imply that for a 
hypothetical policy change that increases Medicaid use by 1 percentage point, the 
network for these language groups will increase the probability of having Medicaid by 
10 percentage points for adults and 7 percentage points for kids.   
Chapter 6 summarizes and highlights the main results, policy implications, key 
contributions of the dissertation, study limitations, and areas for future research.   From 
a policy perspective, changes such as Medicaid expansions or marketing campaigns can 
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have a direct effect on Medicaid/CHIP take-up and an indirect multiplier-effect through 
language-geography networks. This result implies that CMS can achieve “more-bang-for-
their-buck” in areas that have a high concentration of language groups that are more 
likely to value Medicaid relative to being uninsured as a whole.  However, in order to 
maximize Medicaid/CHIP take-up, if desired, CMS would need to devote additional 
marketing and outreach resources towards language groups that are currently 
uninformed about government health insurance and/or have low perceived benefits or 
high face costs of enrollment.  The results also imply that it will be more difficult or 
costly to convince uninsured “hermit-types”5 to enroll in Medicaid or CHIP. 
  
                                                          
5
 I would like to thank Mark Pauly for coming up with this name! 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 This chapter reviews the most relevant existing literature related to the take-up 
of Medicaid/CHIP benefits and the role of networks influencing individual economic 
outcomes.  The goal of this chapter is to identify the main contributions of this paper, 
given the gaps in the existing literature.  Readers should refer to Klees, Wolfe, and Curtis 
(2010) for additional background information related to Medicaid, such as eligibility 
rules, scope of services, amount and duration of services, and payment issue. 
 
2.A The Take-Up of Government Benefits  
 It is widely known that some of the uninsured, adults and children alike, are 
eligible for “free” public coverage.  Most recently, Kenney et al. (2010) estimated that 
7.3 million children were uninsured on the 2008 ACS, of whom 4.7 million or 65% were 
eligible for Medicaid or CHIP but not enrolled.6  The authors use the Urban Institute 
Health Policy Center’s ACS Medicaid/CHIP Eligibility Simulation Model to determine 
Medicaid/CHIP eligibility.  This dissertation uses a different methodology to define 
eligibility (see Chapter 4), but obtains consistent eligibility and take-up estimates.  
Kenney et al. (2010) also found that participation rates substantially varied across 
                                                          
6
 Similar to this study, Kenney et al. (2010) defines participation as the ratio of eligible children enrolled in 
Medicaid/CHIP to those children plus uninsured children who are eligible for Medicaid/CHIP. 
 16 
 
 
 
states, ranging from 55% to 95%, and individual/household characteristics.  Most 
relevant to this study, the authors estimated participation rates of 83% among children 
with at least one English-speaking parent in the home, compared to 77% among 
children without any English-Speaking parents in the home. 
Other studies produce take-up estimates ranging from 50-70% and find take-up 
decreases as Medicaid/CHIP income eligibility thresholds increase.  By 1996, the 
Medicaid take-up rate among eligible children was approximately 70% (Gruber 2003; 
Selden et al. 1998).   This translates into 4.7 million uninsured children that were eligible 
for Medicaid benefits during this time period (Selden et al. 1998).  Another study found 
that the percent of children eligible for Medicaid increased by 15 percentage points 
between 1984 and 1992, but the fraction covered increased by only 7.4 percentage 
points (Currie and Gruber 1996a).  Cutler and Gruber (1996) and Currie and Gruber 
(1996b) also found that among newly eligible children and women of childbearing age, 
only 23% and 34%, respectively, took up public coverage.  Using the CPS and SIPP, 
another study found that the OBRA 1990 expansion led to an 8-percentage point rise in 
Medicaid coverage for children just inside the eligibility limits, and a similar rise in 
coverall health insurance (Card and Shore-Sheppard 2004).   The authors concluded that 
the effect of Medicaid expansions was limited by low take-up rates among newly eligible 
children rather than by the crowding out of private health insurance.  Similarly, LoSasso 
and Buchmueller (2004) estimate SCHIP take-up rates ranging from 8 to 14 percent 
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among the newly eligible populations, and hypothesize that the newly eligible 
population may not be aware of their benefits especially if they had not previously 
participated.  However, many of these children were already covered by other sources 
of health insurance. 
 Individuals do not take-up government programs because of high transaction 
costs due to administrative barriers and/or low perceived benefits.  Two major literature 
reviews (Currie 2006; Remler and Glied 2003) conclude that take-up could be hindered 
by administrative barriers, lack of information, and “stigma” associated with 
government programs.  However, both studies conclude that administrative barriers 
matter the most, whereas stigma does not have significant effect on take-up.  The 
literature reviews also found that larger program benefits have a positive effect on 
participation.  For example, Ettner (1997) finds that elderly people with chronic 
functional limitations are four times more likely to take-up Medicaid than those without 
limitations.  Similarly, many physicians do not treat publicly insured because of relatively 
low reimbursement rates (Currie 2006), which can alter a patient’s valuation of 
Medicaid benefits relative to being uninsured.  The bullets below summarize some of 
the key findings on why eligible populations do not take-up government benefits: 
 Administrative barriers:  Up to a quarter of Medicaid applicants cannot produce 
the necessary documentation (e.g., birth certificate, citizenship papers, proof of 
residency, and proof of income) within the required time or fail to attend all of 
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the required interviews necessary to receive Medicaid benefits (GAO 1994).  
Evidence from the behavioral economics literature suggests that some of these 
small hassles and procrastination might explain why some individuals do not 
take-up program benefits (Bertrand et al. 2004), whereas changing the program 
design to utilize the existing tax system might make enrollment easier for eligible 
populations with income levels above the tax filing threshold (Congdon et al. 
2011).    
The results from regression analyses show that measures of 
inconvenience, such as perceived application length, hinder take-up, while 
policies such as presumptive eligibility, which lower inconvenience costs, have a 
significant positive impact on take-up.  Design mechanisms-eliminating asset 
tests, offering continuous eligibility and coverage, simplifying the application and 
renewal processes, and extending benefits to parents--have large statistically 
significant positive effects on CHIP take-up rates, while mandatory waiting 
periods reduce take-up (Bansak and Raphael 2006).  Wolfe and Scrivner (2005) 
obtain consistent results and also find evidence suggesting that specific outreach 
activities can have a positive effect on SCHIP take-up.  However, the validity of 
these results is questionable due the small number of policy changes relative to 
the long time-frames for each study and the fact policy changes tend to be 
correlated with state budgetary considerations.  In a much more 
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methodologically sound study, Aizer (2003) examines Medicaid enrollment in 
California from 1996 to 2000 and the timing and placement of community-based 
application assistants that were part of a 2008 outreach campaign.  She finds 
that application assistance programs had a large impact on Medicaid 
enrollments, particularly among Hispanic (4.6 percent) and Asian (6 percent) 
children relative to other children in the same community.  
 Information:  Medicaid eligibility rules are complex and individuals can qualify 
through a number of pathways, some of which are required by federal law and 
others are optional for states (Artiga 2009; Hearne 2005).7  While most parents 
might have heard of Medicaid or CHIP, they do not necessary know of details 
related to benefit levels and eligibility.  Proxies for information, such as 
educational attainment, provide weak results.  Some evidence shows that those 
who are confused about Medicaid eligibility rules are 1.8 times less likely to take-
up Medicaid (Stuber et al. 2000). Learning over time might also occur as lagged 
eligibility has a greater effect on take-up than current eligibility (Yelowitz 2000).   
This is consistent with the relatively low take-up estimates among the newly 
eligible populations who might not be aware of their benefits. 
 Stigma:  Stigma can be defined as the psychological feeling of shame or a social 
sense of disrespect associated with program participation (Remler and Glied 
                                                          
7
 See chapter 4 for a more in-depth analysis of Medicaid/CHIP eligibility rules. 
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2003), or to put it in simpler economic terms, the disutility arising from 
participation in a welfare-related program per se (Moffit 1983).  Moffit (1983) 
models non-participation in government programs as a utility-maximizing 
decision, where the main cost is the stigma associated with participation.  
Despite having a compelling theoretical underpinning, empirical measures of 
stigma are difficult to interpret and the results are generally weak (Remler and 
Glied 2003).  Stigma associated with Medicaid/CHIP participation would also be 
difficult to separate from stigma associated with having sufficiently low income 
to be eligible in the first place.     
2.B Theory of Networks and Economic Behavior 
Network theory can be broadly divided into two categories: The theory behind 
network formation and the theory behind how networks impact economic outcomes.  In 
the most simplisitic model of network formation, individuals interact with others in their 
network if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.   More formally, Jackson (2005) 
and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) show the net utility ui(g) that person i receives from a 
network g is 
 
Where pij(g) is the number of links in the shortest path between individuals i and j, cij>0 
is the cost to maintain a direct relationship with person j, and δij is a factor between 0 
ij gijij
ij
gp
iji cgu
ij
:
)(
)()(
 21 
 
 
 
and 1 that indicates the benefit from a direct relationship with person j and is raised to 
higher powers for more distant relationships.  For example, consider a network where 
person 1 is linked to 2, 2 is linked to 3, and 3 is linked to 4; person 1 gets a benefit of δ12 
from the direct connection with person 2, a benefit of (δ13)
2 from the indirect 
connection with person 3, and a benefit of (δ14)
3 from the indirect connection with 
person 4.  Since δij < 1, there is a lower benefit from an indirect connection than a direct 
one.  However, individuals only pay costs for maintaining direct relationships whereas 
indirect relationships are costless.  The model also shows which networks are efficient 
and which networks are likely to form when individuals choose their own links as 
modeled through pairwise stability.  A network is pairwise stable if no player wants to 
sever a link and no two players both want to add a link in the network.  
 It is important to note that the power relationship between δij and pij(g) can only 
be empirically tested when complete data on the network structure are available.  In 
this study’s empirical analysis, actual direct and indirect connections within each 
individual’s network are unobserved and therefor I assume network formation is 
exogenous.  In other words, this dissertation assumes that individuals are born into 
language groups and area of residence is exogenous8, with this latter assumption tested 
through various sensitivity models.   
                                                          
8
 Or endogenous, but in a way that is uncorrelated with health insurance choice. 
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The more pertinent models relate to how networks influence individual 
economic outcomes. Sociologists have had a major influence on this area of network 
research (Granovetter 1973; 2005) and have developed similar prediction as economics:  
networks affect the flow and quality of information and networks influence behavior 
through the spread of social norms.  While some economists have analyzed how 
networks influence individual outcomes through social norms, such as peer pressure, 
role models, stigma, or social approval (For example, see Akerlof 1980; Lindbeck et al. 
1999; Besley and Coate 1992; Moffit 1983), this section, and dissertation as a whole, 
focuses economic models that explain how networks influence individual behavior 
through the spread of information. 
Bala and Goyal (1998) develop a model of Bayesian learning where agents use 
their own past experience as well as the experience of their neighbors to guide their 
decision making.  Through various assumptions, the authors show that in a connected 
society, “local learning ensures that all agents obtain the same payoffs in the long run” 
and eventually converge to choosing the same action.  Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) 
develop a model of social learning where agents take into account the experiences of 
their neighbors in deciding which of two technologies to use.  Ellison and Fudenberg 
(1995) also examine how word-of-mouth communication accumulates information of 
individual agents and may lead all players to adopt the action that is on average 
superior, depending on what people are saying.  These models are specific to 
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technological adoption but they illustrate how social learning can lead to different 
outcomes among heterogeneous groups. 
Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) describe how networks influence 
individual behavior through imitation of behavior.  Both of these models make 
predictions of individual behavior based on information from groups or previous 
decision makers.  Banerjee (1992) analyzes a sequential decision model in which each 
agent looks at the decisions made by previous agents before making their own 
decisions.  The model produces an inefficient equilibrium where people do what others 
are doing rather than using their private information.  Bikhchandani et al. (1992) find 
that localized conformity of behavior can be explained by informational cascades, which 
occur when it is for an individual to follow the behavior of the preceding individual 
without regard to his own information.   
Networks can also be viewed in the context of search costs.  Pauly and 
Sattherwaite (1981) show that the reputation of a physician is formed through 
information shared between consumers.  They find that a higher number of physicians 
lowers the ratio of friends per provider, and therefore increases search costs because 
consumers communicate with others to learn the reputation of the providers.  
Empirically, they look at primary care physician services and show that increasing the 
number of sellers leads to price increases.  In the context of electronic marketplaces, 
Bakos (1997) views networks as an intermediary between the buyers and sellers in a 
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market, creating a marketplace that lowers the costs to acquire information about seller 
price, product details, and product availability.  
2.C Network Empirical Applications 
 There is little to no literature on how language and geography influence the 
probability of taking up Medicaid or having health insurance in general.  However, there 
are several studies that explore how language, race/ethnicity, and geography influence 
different economic outcomes.  There are also a myriad other studies, both within and 
outside the field of health economics, that test the role of networks, peer, or 
neighborhood effects in various markets. 
The empirical method in this dissertation is motivated by studies that explore 
how language and geography-defined networks influence welfare use and health care 
utilization.  The empirical framework for this paper is derived from Bertrand et al. 
(2000), who examine the role of networks in welfare participation using data on 
language spoken at home and geography to define networks. The authors hypothesize 
that, by reducing the stigma associated with welfare use and through the spread of 
information, being surrounded by high welfare-using contacts increases the individual’s 
welfare recipiency more than being surrounded by low welfare-using contacts.  They 
use the number of people in one’s local area who speak one’s language to measure 
contact availability and the mean welfare use of the language group as a proxy for 
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network quality.  The interaction between these two variables (network 
quality*network quantity) defines they key variable of interest. They also control for 
local area and language group fixed effects.  Their results imply that networks would 
raise the responsiveness of welfare take-up policy shocks by 15-27%.  Deri (2005) uses a 
similar method to estimate the impact of language-geography networks on health care 
utilization among immigrants in Canada.  She finds that networks have an impact on 
health care utilization and that the utilization of services by immigrants increases with 
the number of physicians who speak their language in their neighborhood. One of her 
key results is that a policy that increases the use of regular doctors by 1 percentage 
point will increase the probability of having a regular doctor in the language group 
network by 4.9 percentage points.   
Aizer and Currie (2004) analyze the effects of networks on the utilization of 
publicly-funded maternity care in California.  They define networks using 5-digit zip 
codes and a woman’s racial or ethnic group.  The outcome they focus on is whether 
women who went on to have a public delivery used public services beginning in the first 
trimester of their pregnancies.  The authors find correlations between individual use of 
publicly-funded maternity care and group use.  They run various models, including one 
similar to Bertrand et al (2000), and find that the correlations still exist.  However, the 
authors reject the hypothesis that the estimated network effects represent information 
sharing within groups.  They find that network effects persist even among women who 
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already knew about the services because they had used it in the past.  Unfortunately, 
this study is limited by a loose definition of networks (ethnicity), lack of data on other 
Medicaid eligible groups besides pregnant woman, and lack of data beyond California. 
Several other papers attempt to measure how language and racial/ethnic group 
behavior influence individual behavior.   Gresenz, Rogowski, and Escarce (2007) find that 
for Mexican-American immigrants, living in an area populated by relatively more 
Hispanics, more immigrants, or more Spanish-speakers increases access to care (e.g., 
usual source of care and number of office visits).  The authors believe that this is 
facilitated by the flow of information among people in the local area about where to go 
for care and what processes to use to get there.  They also find that the network effects 
are stronger for more recent immigrants compared to those who are more established 
in the U.S., and find no effects on access to care for U.S. born Mexican-Americans.  
Devillanova (2008) uses a dataset with large sample of undocumented immigrants in 
Milan and contains a direct indicator of information networks-whether an immigrant 
was referred to health care opportunities by a strong social tie.  The dependent variable 
in this analysis is the log of time spent in Italy before an immigrant first utilized health 
care.  The key network variable is a dummy indicating whether or not the individual 
came in contact with Naga, a voluntary association which offers free primary care to 
irregular immigrants, through a strong social network of friends or relatives.  Overall, 
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the author finds that networks significantly accelerate health care utilization, reducing 
the time to visit by about 30%. 
Borjas (1992, 1995) introduce ethnic capital into an economic model of 
intergenerational mobility.  The author defines the dependent variable as the child’s 
educational attainment level (or earnings) and defines the key independent network 
variable as the mean educational attainment of the ethnic group of the father’s 
generation.  Borjas and Hilton (1996) use a similar method to show that that types of 
public benefits used by an ethnic group’s previous generation can predict those used in 
the current generation.  However, this methodology does not sufficiently control for 
unobservable personal and ethnic group characteristics that might be correlated with 
the network variable. 
To investigate the effect of ethnic capital in the context of this study, one can 
regress individual health insurance status on the mean health insurance status of the 
ethnic group in the previous generation (along with observable individual and ethnic 
group characteristics).  However, this type of model, and the model used by Gresenz, 
Rogowski, and Escarce (2007), suffers from two omitted variable biases: (1) Omitted 
personal characteristics may be correlated with the network variable and (2) Omitted 
ethnic group characteristics may be correlated with the network variable (Bertrand et al. 
2000).    This study includes both neighborhood and language group fixed effects in 
order to avoid biases associated with omitted language/ethnic group and neighborhood 
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characteristics.  In addition, networks defined by language group as opposed to ethnic 
group provide a more precise measure of social links because ancestry can often include 
individuals who are loosely connected to their ethnic group (Alba 1991; Lazear 1995). 
These econometric concerns are further discussed in Chapter 4. 
To the author’s knowledge, only one other study explores the effects of 
networks on health insurance outcomes.  Using panel data from the University of 
California, Sorensen (2006) quantifies the impact of social learning on individuals’ choice 
of employer-sponsored health plans.  To avoid simultaneity problems, the author 
focuses on the choices of newly hired employees and assumes their health plan choices 
are influenced by coworkers, but not vice versa.  Sorensen finds that health plan choices 
are correlated across individuals within the same department.  He also uses discrete 
choice models and finds large and statistically significant social learning effects that are 
robust across campuses and model specifications.    
There are also several related neighborhood effects studies to note.  One study 
finds that socioeconomic factors, including the racial composition of an area or its 
income level, can have independent effects beyond the sum of the effects of the race 
and income of individuals in the area (Subramanian and Kawachi 2004).  This result is 
consistent with the Gautreaux Experiment (Rosenbaum 1995) and Moving to 
Opportunity Experiment (MTO, Katz et al. 2001; Ludwig et al. 2001).  Gautreaux was a 
US housing desegregation projected initiated by court order.  Public housing residents 
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were essentially randomly assigned to neighborhoods (urban and suburban) in Chicago 
in order to mitigate high concentrations of poverty.  Rosenbaum (1995) found that 
women allocated to better, typically suburban, neighborhoods experienced better 
outcomes, e.g., they were more likely to find employment and leave welfare.  Due to its 
initial success, the Gautreaux experiment became a model for similar programs in 
various metropolitan areas and inspired the national MTO program. MTO was a true 
random assignment demonstration.  Initial results are suggestive of strong 
neighborhood effects on child problem behaviors, child and adult health outcomes, and 
juvenile crime (Katz et al. 2001; Ludwig et al. 2001). 
  Pagan and Pauly (2006) find that community-level uninsurance rates are 
positively associated with having reported unmet medical needs, but only for insured 
adults. They find that, on average, a five percentage point increase in the local 
uninsured population is associated with a 10.5 percent increase in the likelihood that an 
insured adult will report having unmet medical needs during the 12-month period 
studied.  Pauly and Pagan (2007) further expand and conclude that reducing the size of 
the uninsured population yields important spillover benefits to the insured population 
that go beyond a lower charity care burden e.g., the quality of care available to 
everyone locally as a result of the low demand for quality by the uninsured. 
 Finally, the existing literature shows that social networks play an important role 
influencing individual behavior in labor markets, as a means of matching workers and 
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firms9 (Ioannides and Loury 2004), crime, as a way of explaining the high variance of 
crime rates across time and space (Glaeser et al. 1996), retirement plan decisions (Duflo 
and Saez 2003), juvenile behavior (Gaviria and Raphael 2001), educational attainment 
(Sacerdote 2001; Evans et al. 1992) and obesity (Christakis and Fowler 2007). This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the key findings and methodological 
contributions of some of these studies. 
The use of randomized or natural experiments highlights how networks can alter 
the flow of information.  Duflo and Saez (2003) used a randomized experiment to 
analyze the role of information and social interactions in employees’ decisions to enroll 
in a Tax Deferred Account (TDA) retirement plan within a large university.  The 
experiment provided financial incentives to a random sample of workers within a 
random subset of departments to attend a TDA information fair sponsored by the 
university.  The nature of the experiment allowed the authors to compare results among 
treated individuals in treated departments, untreated individuals in treated 
departments, and untreated individuals in untreated departments.  The experiment 
increased the attendance rate for treated individuals by five-fold relative to the 
controls, and tripled the attendance rate for untreated individuals within treated 
departments.  The authors also found that effect on TDA enrollment is almost as large 
for individuals in treated departments who did not receive the financial incentive as for 
                                                          
9
 This study will not focus on employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) as an outcome because ESI rates are 
largely explained by labor market decisions 
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those who did.  This result can be attributable to differential treatment effects, social 
network effects, and motivational reward effects.  Sacerdote (2001) finds strong 
evidence for the existence of peer effects in student outcomes at Dartmouth College.  
Using data on freshman year roommates and dormmates, both of which are randomly 
assigned, he finds that peer effects in GPA occur at the roommate level and peer effects 
in fraternity membership occurs at the roommate and dorm level. 
Christakis and Fowler (2007) and Fowler and Christakis (2008) use a panel of 
interconnected networks as part of the Framingham Heart Study to determine if obesity 
is spread through person-to-person interactions.  They use a panel logistic regression 
models in which the “ego’s” (the individual) obesity status is a function of various 
personal attributes, including lagged obesity status, and the “alter’s’” (e.g., friend, 
sibling, or spouse) current and lagged obesity status.  They use generalized estimating 
equations to account for multiple observations of the same ego across examinations 
and “ego-alter” pairs.  They find that a person’s chances of becoming obese increased 
by 57% if he/she had a friend who became obese in a given time interval.  They also 
obtained similar findings from siblings (40%) and spouses (37%).   
Cohen-Cole and Fletcher (2008) respond by arguing that Christakis and Fowler 
(2007) fail to control for contextual effects, creating spurious inference on the social 
networks effect.  The authors are able to replicate a similar model and obtain similar 
results from Christakis and Fowler (2007) using the Add Health panel dataset, a national 
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sample of 7th-12th graders who transition into early adulthood.  Their first model did not 
control for school-specific trends that account for any environmental factors shared by 
individuals at the same school.  After including school-level fixed effects, the authors 
find a large drop in the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient of 
interest.  Trogden et al. (2008) also use the Add Health panel to estimate peer effects 
for adolescent weight.  They control for the endogeneity of peer groups by using a 
combination of school fixed effects, instrumental variables, and alternative (exogenous) 
definitions of peers.  Even after controlling for endogenous peer effects, they find that 
mean peer weight is correlated with adolescent weight.  The conflicting results from 
these obesity studies highlights the theoretical and econometric challenges associated 
with network-related studies. 
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Chapter 3: Theory 
In this chapter, I build a model that illustrates how language and geography-
defined networks shape health insurance choices.   Better information on insurance 
states, gleaned through the network, can help consumers decide whether or not to take 
up a Medicaid benefit or remain uninsured.   
3.A Assumptions 
Networks can play an important role in providing consumers with information 
related to health insurance choices.  Health insurance products can be complex and vary 
across geographic markets; consumers must make choices based on risk and can choose 
policies with various levels of benefits, price schedules, deductibles, networks, and/or 
coinsurance rates. Similarly, some individuals do not take-up Medicaid benefits because 
of administrative barriers (high transaction costs), lack of information and perceived 
benefits, and “stigma” associated with government programs (see Chapter 2 for more 
information).  The model described below illustrates how language-geography networks 
influence individual outcomes by providing information on the value of health insurance 
choices among the individual’s language group. 
A simple theoretical model of expected utility maximization illustrates this 
behavioral effect.  This model builds on the stylistic features (expected utility 
maximization model) from Herring (2005) and some of the social interaction 
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mechanisms from Brock and Durlauf (2001).  Herring (2005) developed a simple utility 
maximization model that predicts how the existence of charity decreases the propensity 
to purchase private health insurance.  Brock and Durlauf (2001) study generalized 
logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of 
individuals to conform to the behavior of others in an environment of non-cooperative 
decision-making.  The following assumptions characterize the key features of the model:   
 To clarify, this model deviates from the random utility framework in Brock and 
Durlauf 2001) and Brock and Durlauf (2002)10, even though these models have 
nice econometric properties associated with logit and multinomial logit models, 
respectively.  There are two main reasons for this.  First, expected utility 
maximization models are widely used when dealing with choices related to risk 
and uncertainty and the predictions from this type of model are intuitive and 
clear-cut relative to the theoretical complications associated with the models in 
Brock and Durlauf.  Second, while using a non-linear logistic framework might be 
more theoretically sound, it creates multiple complications for empirical 
implementation.  The main network variable, an interaction of two continuous 
variables, is much easier to interpret with a linear probability model (LPM).  
LPMs also have much more flexibility in terms of using fixed effects relative to 
                                                          
10
 See McFadden (1974, 1981) for a discussion of random utility models. 
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the non-linear counterparts.  Chapter 4 provides a more in-depth discussion and 
Chapter 5 compares the results from LPMs, logit, and multinomial logit models.   
 This model focuses on the Medicaid-eligible population whom speak a language 
other than English at home and assumes these individual’s face the choice of 
taking up Medicaid or being uninsured.  These assumptions make the model 
more tractable, but can be relaxed to incorporate more than two choices or 
different populations. 
 The model also assumes that individuals face a disutility from the total amount 
of medical care expenses and the valuation of risk associated with the variation 
in the amount of expenses.  For simplicity, the model assumes each individual 
faces the full cost of medical expenses if they are uninsured.  The existence of 
uncompensated care (in many instances, Medicaid will retroactively reimburse 
hospitals for treatment of those who are uninsured but eligible) reduces the 
realism of this assumption, however, the Medicaid eligible population does face 
non-zero medical expenses and risk and this parameter captures the benefit of 
coverage relative to being uninsured. 
 Network formation is exogenous and in a state with imperfect information, each 
individual interacts with others in their common language group and local area.  
Exogenous network formation is a fair assumption due to the fact that 
individuals are born into language groups and differential selection across 
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geographic areas does not appear to be a major issue (See Chapter 4 for a more 
detailed discussion of this issue).  The sociological and economic literature also 
strongly suggests that non-English speakers mainly interact with others in their 
common language group.   
 Conditional upon eligibility, language groups with higher Medicaid/CHIP take-up 
rates are presumed to have a greater knowledge about the program.  This 
assumption is sensible because it merely relates knowledge about 
Medicaid/CHIP with actual experience and encounters with the program.  In 
other words, this assumption implies that language groups with higher take-up 
rates know more about important Medicaid/CHIP details such as eligibility rules, 
application requirements, and potential benefits of coverage.   
 Each individual derives utility from the beliefs about the behavior of others in his 
language group.  The model assumes individual  is influenced by what he thinks 
others in his group are doing via expectations derived by composition of his local 
area, not by their actual behavior per se. 
 For comparison purposes, this model assumes there are two states of the world, 
one where consumers are perfectly informed about characteristics of each 
health insurance choice, and one where consumers are imperfectly informed.  I 
assume that there are no social interaction effects in the former, whereas 
individuals rely on their language group for information in the latter. 
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 The model uses the following indices: individual , language group , and local 
area  
3.B The Model 
The expected utility of an uninsured individual  facing uncertain costs of medical 
care can be expressed as 
 (1)  
Where  is ’s income,  is the total amount of health expenses, and  is the 
ex-ante valuation of risk due to the variation in the realization of    is the Arrow-
Pratt relative risk aversion coefficient and  is the variance of .  For further 
discussion on the valuation of risk, see Feldman and Dowd (1991) on the derivation and 
Herring (2005) and Pauly, Blavin, and Meghan (2009) for additional applications.   
The expected utility of individual  if fully insured by Medicaid in this state of the 
world is 
  (2)  
Where  are the total costs associated with Medicaid take-up.   includes any 
premium and cost sharing that individual  may face and indirect costs (e.g., time and 
hassle costs) associated with taking-up Medicaid.   
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Individual  chooses to take-up Medicaid if > .  Individual ’s 
propensity for taking-up Medicaid, as defined as the difference between expected 
utilities, is expressed as 
 
 (3)  
In other words, consumers are more likely to take-up Medicaid if the expected benefit 
of doing so, measured by the decrease in medical expenses and risk, is greater than the 
expected cost. 
 Now, suppose that each individual faces imperfect information related to the 
costs and benefits of Medicaid relative to being uninsured and relies on his/her 
language group for information.  In the presence of social interactions, the sum of 
private and social utility for individual  if uninsured is: 
 
 
 
 
(4)  
Where 
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  (5)  
Equation (4) shows that each consumer receives more utility from being uninsured if 
they expect a higher proportion of their language group to be uninsured.  The term 
embodies a multiplicative interaction between the expected private utility 
associated with being uninsured and the expected social utility associated with being 
uninsured.   is the expected average choices from individual ’s perspective of the 
proportion of his/her language group that is uninsured and  is the actual de-
meaned group uninsurance rate, which proxies for the language group’s valuation of 
being uninsured as a whole (e.g., the language group’s cultural beliefs, physical 
characteristics, and experience with health insurance schemes in native country that 
shape the language group’s proclivity towards being uninsured relative to taking-up 
Medicaid).  As equation (5) illustrates, each individual does not directly observe the 
actual insurance choices of his/her language group. Rather, they receive a signal of this 
valuation, which depends on the proportion  of the person’s local area  that belongs 
to the same language group.  This concept is referred to as contact availability 
throughout the paper.    
Similarly, the expected total utility of taking-up Medicaid in the presence of 
social interactions is 
  (6)  
Where 
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  (7)  
Equations (6) and (7) show that the expected utility associated with Medicaid take-up 
has a multiplicative social interaction effect, with a converse explanation to the one 
described in the previous paragraph.  Intuitively, as  increases, more information 
related to Medicaid (e.g., eligibility and enrollment requirements for take-up) flows 
through a language-geography group and influences each individual’s expected utility of 
take-up. 
Each person chooses to take-up Medicaid if > .  In addition, consistent 
with the method used in (3), individual ’s propensity for taking-up Medicaid is defined 
as the difference between expected utilities:  
  
 
 
(8)  
  
 
(9)  
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Differentiating the propensity to take-up Medicaid, as expressed by (9), by , , and 
, respectively, yields the following testable hypotheses: 
  (10)  
  (11)  
  
 
 
(12)  
  
 
(13)  
 
Equation (11) shows that an exogenous increase in a language group’s Medicaid 
take-up rate is associated with an increase in an individual’s propensity towards 
participating in Medicaid.  In contrast, (12) shows that an exogenous increase in a 
language group’s uninsurance rate is associated with a decrease in an individual’s 
propensity towards participating in Medicaid.   
Equations (12) and (13) illustrate how contact availability has an ambiguous 
effect on the propensity to participate in Medicaid.  An increase in a person’s contact 
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availability is associated with an increase in the propensity towards taking up Medicaid 
if the total utility (individual utility plus social utility that incorporates language group 
behavior) associated with taking-up Medicaid is greater than the total utility associated 
with being uninsured.  Combining these first-order conditions leads to the following 
testable hypothesis:  Being surrounded by a high Medicaid utilizing language group 
increases an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid more than being surrounded 
by a low Medicaid utilizing language group.  
It is important to note that this model does not explicitly predict what the impact 
of being surrounded by others who are part of another language group besides one’s 
own.  However, the results imply that being surrounded by a high concentration of any 
language group that has a high take-up rate could have a positive impact on the 
individual’s probability of take-up.  This is consistent with the “naïve” regression results 
mentioned in the introduction and further discussed in Chapter 5.  These results show 
that the take-up rate in one’s local area (overall, regardless of language) has a very 
strong and positive impact on the individual’s probability of take-up.  However, this 
independent variable captures several local area omitted variables that are correlated 
with the main independent variable.   
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Chapter 4: Empirical Framework 
 
4A.  Data  
Household and Individual-Level Microdata 
This analysis uses pooled cross-sections of the 2008-2009 public use microdata 
sample (PUMS) of the Census’ American Community Survey (ACS).  I downloaded and 
analyzed an augmented version of the survey, the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (IPUMS), from the University of Minnesota Population Center (Ruggles et al. 
2010).  The ACS is part of the reengineered decennial census program and provides 
detailed information every year instead of every ten years.  ACS data are collected 
continuously using independent monthly samples and are designed to produce 
nationally representative economic, social, demographic, and housing information 
(Turner et al. 2009). The ACS samples approximately 1.3 million housing and 3 million 
person records annually throughout the U.S. and Puerto Rico.  The survey is 
administered using a mixed-mode approach-over half of the sample is completed by 
mail and the rest is completed by telephone or in person-and has a reported response 
rate of 98% in both years (Kenney et al. 2010; U.S. Census Bureau 2010). 
 This analysis is feasible because of the uniqueness and size of the ACS data.  The 
U.S. Census Bureau has been conducting the ACS over the past decade, but only recently 
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added a question related to health insurance status for each individual in the household 
in 2008.  To the author’s knowledge, it is the only nationally representative survey that 
contains information on health insurance coverage, language spoken at home, and 
detailed geographic area of residence.  The health insurance question on the ACS 
questionnaire is in Figure 1. 
Research suggests that the that ACS coverage estimates are valid and highly 
consistent with other federally-funded representative surveys such as the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), and National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS) (Turner et al 2009).  However, there is a concern that the survey 
understates Medicaid and CHIP coverage relative to the other surveys because the ACS 
does not specifically mention CHIP or provide names for state’s particular Medicaid and 
CHIP programs (Kenney et al. 2010).  This could create confusion between Medicaid and 
private non-group coverage, leading to an underestimate of the former and an 
overestimate of the latter.  To address this underreporting, in addition to the known 
underreporting of public coverage on household surveys in general, I applied a modified 
set of logical edit rules that were developed by the U.S. Census Bureau (Lynch et al. 
2010).  These edits, displayed in Figure 2, have also been harmonized to analyze changes 
over time (Ruggles et al. 2010).  However, it is important to note that the regression 
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results in Chapter 5 are insensitive to the use of these edits11, which provides evidence 
to favor the notion that Medicaid underreporting is uncorrelated with language and 
geography. 
 The ACS has a distinct advantage over the CPS, MEPS, and NHIS because of its 
large sample size (approximately 3 million individuals or 1% of the US population) which 
allows for estimation at the local area level.  Whereas the other surveys only allow 
estimation at the national, state, or census region level, the ACS contains identifiers for 
public use microdata areas (PUMAs), which consist of populations of approximately 
100,000 individuals, super-PUMAs, areas with approximately 400,000 individuals, and 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), which are larger urban areas that could contain 
multiple PUMAs.12       
In addition to the geographic identifiers and health insurance variables, the ACS 
also contains information on each individual’s language spoken at home.  According to 
both the 2008 and 2009 ACS data, approximately 20% of the non-elderly population 
speaks a language other than English at home (close to 100 different languages).  The 
ACS also contains key individual, household, and family socio-demographic 
characteristics such as on citizenship status, year person came to live in the U.S., 
                                                          
11
 Data not show.  The results from the data without the logical edits were used in the dissertation 
proposal and are highly consistent with the final results.   
12
  MSA identifiers are derived from a crosswalk created by the Missouri Census Data Center 
(http://mcdc.missouri.edu/webrepts/geography/).  PUMAs that belong to multiple MSAs are assigned to 
the MSA with the largest Census population. 
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migration status, country of birth, age, sex, race, marital status, disability status13, 
educational attainment, income, household size, level English fluency, occupation, 
industry and work status.  Given the large sample size of the ACS, I am able to produce 
neighborhood characteristics, such as racial composition, income, and education, at the 
PUMA and MSA-level.   
 The ACS also contains individual and household-level sample weights that can 
be used to produce statistics representative of the population.  This study uses the 
weights to produce descriptive statistics in 5.A and mean-level variables (e.g, language 
group take-up rate), but does not use them for the regression analysis.  The reason for 
this is because when sampling weights are solely a function of independent variables 
included in the model, which they are in the ACS, unweighted ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates are preferred because they are unbiased, consistent, and have small 
standard errors than weighted OLS estimates (Winship and Radbill 1994).  However, 
when weights are used in a sensitivity analysis, they produce results that are consistent 
with the unweighted models.   
 
Other Data Sources 
                                                          
13
 The ACS contains six questions asking if the respondent has serious difficulty hearing, seeing, 
concentrating/remembering/making decisions, walking or climbing stairs, dressing or bathing, and doing 
errands. 
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 I obtained 2008 and 2009 Medicaid/CHIP eligibility thresholds, determined by 
the maximum percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) within a state for Medicaid/CHIP 
or similar programs (e.g., premium assistance), for parents, non-parents and children 
from the Kaiser Family Foundation (Cohen Ross and Marks 2009a; Cohen Ross et al. 
2009b).  Figure 3 shows how eligibility thresholds vary by state and familial status.  For 
example, eligibility for parents varies from 24% FPL in Alabama to 300% FPL in 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont, and eligibility for children ranges 
from 160% FPL in North Dakota to 400% FPL in New York. In addition, childless adults 
are eligible for Medicaid or Medicaid-related benefits in 24 states.    
 I use state-level data from Zuckerman et al. (2009) and Hill et al. (2009) as part of 
the sensitivity analysis discussed in Chapter 4.C.    Zuckerman et al. (2009) collect data 
on average fee by state and procedure and develop a state-level Medicaid Fee Index.  
This measure is used as a proxy state generosity and access to care for adult and child 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  However, it is important to note that the empirical effects of 
Medicaid fee-for-serve payment generosity on access to care are modest (Shen and 
Zuckerman 2005).  Hill et al. (2009) assessed state Medicaid program efforts to reach 
out to and enroll pregnant women into coverage.  Their survey found that 30 states 
produce outreach materials in multiple languages in 2007 and I use this as a proxy for 
state outreach levels among those that speak a non-English language at home.   
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 There are also several hypothetical or ideal data sources that could improve the 
strength of the empirical strategy described below.  First, data at a more detailed 
geographic level (e.g., zip code or census track) could improve the precision of the 
estimation equations and provide a clearer picture of an individual’s actual 
neighborhood or community relative to a PUMA.  It would also be ideal to have better 
data related to other potential network definitions (e.g., characteristics of co-workers, 
church or community membership, etc…) and other health insurance outcomes (e.g., 
participation in Medicare advantage or private non-group coverage).   For example, if 
the necessary data pieces were available in the Health and Retirement Study, it would 
be fruitful to test if language-geography groups influence participation in Medicare 
Advantage plans.  This estimation strategy would also be more precise given the fact 
that 100 percent of the elderly population is eligible for Medicare.   
 
4B. Sample and Sub-Sample Definitions 
This dissertation conducts core and expanded sample analyses for adults and 
children.  The core adult sample includes Medicaid-eligible parents and non-parents 
(determined by FPL thresholds in Figure 3), aged 19 to 64, who speak a language other 
than English at home and are either covered by Medicaid or are uninsured.  The sample 
also excludes individuals that are part of smaller language groups, defined as those with 
less than 1,000 individuals in the ACS sample (e.g., Cebuano), in order to have sufficient 
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sample size for PUMA-level contact availability estimates.  The results are insensitive to 
the choice of this cutoff level.  The core adult sample includes 59,300 individuals 
(7,755,281 weighted) among 41 language groups living in 1,877 PUMAs (522 Super-
PUMAs and 283 MSAs). The expanded adult sample analysis includes those with private 
health insurance, (either employer-sponsored or directly-purchased nongroup 
coverage), increasing the sample size to 83,906 unweighted or 10,786,093 weighted 
adults.     
The core child sample includes Medicaid/CHIP eligible children (determined by 
FPL thresholds in Figure 3) under 19 who live in a non-English household and are either 
covered by Medicaid/CHIP or are uninsured.  The household language is determined by 
the language spoken by the child’s mother because investments in children’s health are 
made largely by a child’s mother (Case and Paxson 2001).  The sample also excludes 
children that are part of smaller language groups.  The core sample includes 136,542 
children (17,459,492 weighted) among 43 language groups living in 2,044 PUMAs (531 
Super-PUMAs and 299 MSAs).  The expanded sample includes those with private health 
insurance, increasing the sample size to 192,414 unweighted or 24,047,763 weighted 
children.    
 This study also focuses on several sub-samples as a part of the sensitivity 
analysis.  An obvious concern is that the results could be exclusively driven by the 
behavior of Spanish-speakers because they comprise the majority of the sample.  A 
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simple solution is to exclude Spanish-speakers from the core and expanded samples.  
Similarly, I also exclude several outlier language groups, such as the Yiddish and 
Pennsylvania Dutch speakers.  I also test how sensitivity the results are to changes in 
Medicaid/CHIP eligibility definitions e.g., focusing on all adults and children who are 
under 200% or 300% FPL.  
This study also addresses several concerns related to immigration and citizenship 
status.  The core sample includes citizens and non-citizens even though most 
immigrants are subject to a five-year ban on eligibility and undocumented immigrants 
are generally ineligible.14  Legal permanent residents are ineligible for Medicaid/CHIP 
during their first five years in the U.S. and become eligible afterwards if they meet the 
programs’ other eligibility requirements.  However, some immigrants (e.g., refugees and 
humanitarian immigrants) are exempt from the bar and are eligible for Medicaid/CHIP 
regardless of their length of residence and 17 states and D.C. have used state funds to 
provide coverage to recent immigrants who would otherwise be ineligible (Cohen Ross 
and Marks 2009a; Cohen Ross et al. 2009b).  The ACS contains information on 
citizenship status (but not undocumented vs. documented), years since entry in the U.S., 
and country of birth.  As part of the sub-sample analysis, I exclude non-citizens, focus on 
the foreign born population (and define networks by country of birth), and focus on 
recent immigrants (<5 years in the U.S.).  The latter two sub-sample analyses are related 
                                                          
14
 Some states use CHIP funds to prove prenatal care to pregnant women, regardless of immigration 
status.  In addition, emergency treatment is available to all immigrants, regardless of status (Kaiser 2006).   
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to econometric identification concerns and are further discussed in 4.C.  I also estimate 
a model that excludes recent immigrants (<5 years) who live in states where they would 
be presumably ineligible. 
 
4C. Empirical Strategies 
The Identification Problem 
Several papers (Manski 1993; Manski 2000; Moffitt 2001; Hartmann et al. 2008) 
highlight the identification problems associated with network, peer, neighborhood, and 
social interaction effects studies.   Networks are difficult to measure, as few data sets 
have information on actual contacts, and those that do are typically endogenous 
because most individuals choose their own contacts.  Empirical researchers are 
therefore challenged to separate the correlations in observed behavior from the true 
causal effects of one agent (or agents) behavior on another.  The “reflection problem”, 
as noted by Manski (1993), occurs because it is difficult to disentangle the direction of 
causation between average group behavior and behavior of one of its members.  The 
following OLS model highlights the identification problems associated with group 
behavior models: 
  (14)  
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Where  is a 0/1 binary variable indicating Medicaid take-up,  is the take-
up rate for group language group j (or local area j),  is a vector of individual 
characteristics, and  is the error term.  One might naively interpret  as the effect of 
language group or local area Medicaid take-up behavior on individual take-up behavior.  
I ran this “naïve” model on the ACS data and, even after controlling for individual and 
household-level characteristics, the estimated coefficient  was .77 for adults and .96 
for children and were statistically significant on at the 1% level.  When I defined  
at the local area level, the estimated coefficient on  was .76 for adults and .85 for 
children and were statistically significant on at the 1% level.  However, this equation is 
plagued by the “reflection problem” and  captures group behavior effects, what the 
researcher is interested in measuring, and unobservable effects, what the researcher 
needs to disentangle.      
Correlation between group behavior and individual outcomes might be 
attributable to correlated unobservables that drive agents in the same reference group 
to behave similarly.  These unobservables might drive exogenous effects, where the 
propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the exogenous 
characteristics of the group, and correlated effects, where individuals in the same group 
tend to behave similarly because they have similar individual characteristics or face 
similar institutional environments (Manski 2000).  Correlated effects can include 
common levels of education and income or access to health insurance, whereas 
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exogenous effects can include a genetic predisposition to heart disease among a 
language group that is correlated with the demand for health insurance.  These 
unobservables are controlled for by using language group and local area fixed effects, 
along with several sensitivity models discussed later in this section. 
The endogenous group formation problem is a subset of correlated effects and 
arises because agents with similar tastes tend to form social groups.  As a result, 
correlation between group and individual behavior may reflect these common tastes, 
and not a causal effect of one on the other (Hartmann et al. 2008; Moffitt 2001).  This 
problem is self-evident in studies that attempt to measure how peer behavior influences 
individual outcomes.  For example, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Christakis and Fowler 
(2007) claim that obesity is a contagion that spreads through social networks.  Studies 
like this might make it to the popular press (see “How Friends Make you Fat”15), but do 
a poor job controlling for endogenous group formation.  Endogenous group formation is 
not a major problem in this dissertation because individuals are generally born into 
language groups and because I am not attempting to measure a direct peer effect; I 
merely assume that others who are part of a common language group are potential 
social contacts as opposed to claiming that individual A is friends with individual B, and 
individual B’s behavior is causally influencing individual A’s behavior.  However, 
                                                          
15
 Rushin, Steve.  “How Friends Make you Fat.”  Time August 2, 2007: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1649321,00.html 
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differential geographic sorting within a language group could create an upward bias in 
the main network variable coefficient.  This problem is addressed later in the chapter. 
The rest of this chapter describes the empirical strategy and how this 
dissertation deals with these identification issues.   
 
Estimation Equations for Core and Expanded Samples 
This dissertation uses two years of pooled cross-sectional data and a similar 
empirical strategy as Bertrand et al. (2000) and Deri (2005). The main independent 
variable in the model varies by each local area-language group combination; the 
variable is defined by the interaction term between contact availability (the density of 
each individual’s language group in their local area) and the Medicaid take-up rate for 
each individual’s language group.  Because this variable is unique to each local area-
language group combination, the model can include dummy variables for each local 
area and language group (fixed effects), which controls for biases associated with 
omitted local area and language group characteristics, respectively16.   
To reiterate, the interaction term (contact availability*language group take-up) 
measures the differential effect (between low and high take-up language groups) of 
                                                          
16
 To clarify, I am including dummy variables for each language group and local area.  I am not using panel 
data. 
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living in areas of high concentration of a common language group (relative to low 
concentration areas) on an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid.  For an 
individual that is part of a high Medicaid/CHIP take-up language group (e.g., above the 
mean), living among a high concentration of his/her language group can increase the 
person’s probability of taking-up Medicaid.  In contrast, for those that are part of a low 
take-up group (e.g., below the mean), living among a high concentration of the language 
group can decrease the person’s probability of taking-up Medicaid relative to living 
among a low concentration of the language group.  These potential contacts might 
believe that costs of enrollment outweigh the benefits  (e.g., it is more convenient to 
remain uninsured and utilize necessary care from safety net providers), and could 
discourage the individual from enrolling.  It is also possible that living among a high 
concentration of the language group increases the probability of take-up, regardless if 
the person is from a low or high take-up group.  However, the differential effect on the 
probability of take-up will be larger among those that are part of a higher take-up 
language group, as these groups might possess more practical knowledge (e.g., 
information related to eligibility and necessary documentation) that could help the 
individual enroll in Medicaid.   
To measure the effects of language-geography defined groups on Medicaid take-
up, I estimate the following OLS model for the adult and child core samples: 
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  (15)  
Where 
  (16)  
 
 
(17)  
In equation (16),  is a binary variable equal to one if eligible individual i, 
who lives in local area j and is part of language group k, takes-up Medicaid and equal to 
zero if they are uninsured.  is the main network variable,  (“contact 
availability") is the direct effect for the quantity of contacts available to individual i (this 
variable also varies over time, but the results are insensitive to this choice),  is a 
vector of individual and household characteristics (including year in survey),   is the 
local area (PUMA, Super-PUMA, or MSA) fixed effect, and  is the language group fixed 
effect.  The direct effect  drops out of the estimation equation because of the 
language group fixed effects.  For all models, I use robust standard errors clustered at 
the local area and language group level.  A positive estimate of  provides evidence in 
favor of the causal effect of networks on Medicaid take-up.    
Equation (17) shows that the main network variable is defined as the interaction 
between contact availability  and network quality, as measured by the mean 
Medicaid take-up rate for language group k.  As discussed in Chapter 3, 
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proxies for the knowledge, information, and attitudes towards Medicaid of 
others from the language group k that live in area j.    is calculated for each 
language group (it does not vary by local area) within the sample and is taken in 
deviation from the sample global take-up rate.  The coefficient on the network variable 
is the same either way, but subtracting the global mean facilitates interpretation of the 
coefficient on the CA measure base effect.  In addition, in order to increase sample size 
and precision, I estimate the language take-up variable over the combined two-year ACS 
file.  It is also important to note that I do not have enough sample size to define 
language group take-up at the PUMA-level or the state-level in some cases.  Even if 
there was sufficient sample size to do so, this measure would be endogenous to 
unobservable differences across local areas; Language group take-up defined at the 
national level is comparatively more exogenous, however, results are robust to the 
specification where take-up is defined at the more local level (see Chapter 5). One 
limitation of this study is that I am unable to identify a potential exogenous source of 
increased Medicaid take-up.  While a couple of states changed their Medicaid eligibility 
rules between 2008 and 2009, these changes were relatively small and took place in 
states with relatively small non-English speaking populations.   
The numerator for the contact availability measure in equation (18)  is the share 
of the population in area j that are part of language group k and the denominator is the 
share of the total United States’ population that is part of language group k.  Contact 
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availability is calculated among all individuals in the ACS file, not just among the 
Medicaid eligible sample.  The denominator in (4) prevents under-weighting of smaller 
groups; without it, small groups would appear to have very small contact availability 
because even at full concentration, they would never be a large fraction of any area 
(Bertrand et al. 2000).  However, the results are robust to the specification without the 
denominator.  I use the natural log transformation so that the CA variable has a normal 
distribution.  Otherwise, distribution for the untransformed variable is heavily skewed 
with a large spike close to 0 and with a long right tail.   
I also test for multicollinearity between  and the base 
effect  by calculating condition indices.  An informal rule of thumb is that if the 
condition number is 15, multicollinearity is a concern and if it is greater than 30, 
multicollinearity is a very serious concern.  I find that multicollinearity is not a concern 
for these variables, as further discussed in Chapter 5, because the condition index is 
sufficiently low. 
In the adult sample, the iX ’s include the following individual and household 
characteristics:  Year in sample, gender, age, educational attainment, race and ethnicity, 
marital status, family structure and size, income relative to poverty, work status, self-
employed status, occupation, English fluency, MSA status, citizenship status, number of 
functional limitations, welfare use, and foreign born status.  The child sample includes 
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similar covariates, but educational attainment and work status are defined at the 
household level.   
I estimate a similar OLS model for the expanded sample analysis: 
  (18)  
Where is a binary variable equal to one if the individual has any health 
insurance and zero otherwise.   is the same as in (17), but is estimated among 
the entire expanded sample as opposed to the core sample that excludes those with 
private health insurance.   is defined in the same manner as (18).  
 
Addressing Identification Concerns 
Under an ideal scenario, I would use an experiment to causally identify the 
effects of language and geography on Medicaid take-up.  For example, similar to the 
Gautreaux experiment, I would randomly assign non-English speakers to neighborhoods 
with varying levels of own language group contact availability.  This type of experiment 
would identify the causal effects of contact availability (e.g., neighborhood effects), but 
it would not perfectly identify the effects of language group quality; the true ideal 
experiment that would randomize individuals into neighborhoods and language groups.  
These experiments are not feasible for this dissertation. 
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Alternatively, if the ACS health insurance questions went back further than 2008, 
I could take advantage of the early Medicaid and SCHIP expansions (e.g., 1997 to 2001 
when states were implementing SCHIP) as a natural experiment to identify exogenous 
participation in public programs among various language groups.  Similarly, as part of 
future research, I can expand on the methods from this paper to examine if there are 
any language-geography network effects associated with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion 
for adults under 138 percent of the FPL.  However, this natural experiment would 
provide an exogenous shock in Medicaid participation, but it would not exogenously 
influence an individual’s geographic location.  A potential natural experiment would be 
to further explore migration patterns (e.g., natural disaster in country X leads to an 
exogenous displacement of a population in city Y of country Z) to identify how random 
shocks in contact availability affect Medicaid take-up. 
Given the limitations of the data at hand, empirical identification relies on two 
assumptions.  First, an individual’s PUMA residency is exogenous, or at least 
uncorrelated with the decision to participate in Medicaid.   Second, language groups 
exogenously form (e.g., individuals are born into them) and language group take-up 
rates serve as a proxy for each language group’s knowledge and proclivity towards 
participating in Medicaid relative to being uninsured.  The main strength of this model it 
includes both language group and local area fixed effects, which is possible because the 
main network variable is an interaction term.  The PUMA dummies control for omitted 
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local area characteristics and unobserved differences between areas, the language 
group dummies control for omitted language group characteristics and unobserved 
differences between groups, and the main CA effect controls for other unobserved 
characteristics e.g., ambition, which may reduce the likelihood of having insurance and 
the probability of living among one’s language group. The rest of this section highlights 
specific examples identification concerns and discusses how the empirical strategy 
address each of these issues.    
There is potential for differential geographic sorting, where people who live in 
areas of high density of their language group are different in some unobservable way 
from people who live in low density areas, but in a way that is correlated with health 
insurance rates.  In other words, there are omitted individual characteristics that are 
correlated with the key network variable.  One solution to differential sorting is to 
construct the network and CA variables at the larger super-PUMA and MSA levels and 
use the corresponding local area fixed effects.  Comparable estimates between these 
models and the main estimation model provides evidence that differential sorting is not 
driving the main results, assuming that MSA or super-PUMA location is exogenous, 
whereas the exact location within the MSA or super-PUMA (e.g., PUMA) can be a choice 
variable.  If differential sorting is driving the results, the estimates from (19) and (19) are 
biased upwards relative to super-PUMA and MSA model.  I also address sorting issues by 
comparing the network effects among those who moved in the past year vs. those who 
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stayed in the same home and those who are recent immigrants vs. those who have been 
in the U.S. for longer periods of time.  
A second method to address differential sorting is to include controls for number 
of years since entry (YSE) into the U.S. and interaction terms between YSE and language 
group.  This model controls for the omitted variable biases associated with immigrant 
behavior over time.  For example, recent immigrants might be more likely to initially 
locate in high CA areas and might be more homogenous relative to other immigrants.  
Over time, immigrants start to relocate in a way that is consistent with differential 
sorting (Deri 2005).  Similarly, a regression model limited to recent immigrants (e.g., 
those who have been in the U.S. for less than two or five years) can avoid the same type 
of omitted variable bias. 
Similarly, comparing the results with defined at the national level versus 
at the MSA-level provides insight into whether or not language-group take-up is 
exogenous.  In (16) and (19), take-up is defined at the language-group level among the 
Medicaid/CHIP eligible population. If the results drastically change when  is 
defined at the MSA-language group or super PUMA-language group level, there might 
be some concerns that there is selection taking places across MSAs.   
There are several other potential alternative explanations of the results that I 
address.  First, individuals might sort based on health status in a way that is correlated 
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with take-up.  I address this concern by running separate models for the disabled and 
non-disabled populations.  Another alternative explanation of the results might be due 
to supply-side behavior of Medicaid offices.  A large concentration of a high Medicaid-
using language group in an area may lead to CMS to hire more people in that area who 
speak that language, or to start an advertising or outreach campaign targeted towards 
specific language groups. Individuals in that language group and area will face lower 
search costs and might be more likely to take-up Medicaid benefits. This alternative 
explanation also predicts a positive coefficient on the main network variable.  To avoid 
this problem, I limit the sample to Spanish speakers only and define the CA and network 
variables based on country of birth.17  This model assumes that those who are born in 
the same country are more likely to interact with one another, and the empirical model 
predicts a positive coefficient on the main network variable.  However, the supply-side 
explanation predicts no effect because everyone in the sample speaks the same 
language.  The only way that supply-side behavior can drive the results is if CMS starts to 
differentially target individuals based on their country of birth as opposed to language.  
Another potential solution is to exclude states (e.g., NY and CA) that are known to have 
extensive Medicaid/CHIP outreach efforts or states that are known to have outreach 
efforts in multiple languages to see if the coefficient on the main network variable 
drastically changes.      
                                                          
17
 The country groups for this model include those from Puerto Rico, Spain, Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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Local Area Characteristics 
 While the fixed effects models can effectively deal with identification concerns, 
models (16) and (19) hide how local area characteristics are correlated with the 
Medicaid take-up decision.  The fixed effects model also prevents the researcher from 
exploring how network strength varies depending on local area characteristics or state 
policy choices.  To provide insight into what is going on behind the scenes, I remove the 
PUMA fixed effect  and replace it with a vector of PUMA characteristics.  These 
characteristics include average age, the percent of the PUMA that is non-white, the 
percent of the PUMA living in poverty, and the percent of the PUMA that is foreign 
born.  I also calculate the condition index associated with these variables to determine if 
multicollinearity is a concern.  Given that the condition index is close to 50, I run the 
model with one characteristic at a time.   
I also test if network strength varies by type of neighborhood by dividing the 
sample into quintiles based on PUMA characteristics.   For example, I explore if network 
effects are stronger in lower-income or geographically smaller neighborhoods.   I also 
use the state-level Medicaid fee index and language outreach dummy and interact each 
with the network variable to test if networks are stronger in states that have less 
generous Medicaid programs or weaker outreach efforts, respectively. 
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Model Specification Checks and Other Sensitivity Tests 
 I also check to see if the results differ when using non-linear binary models (logit, 
probit).  For the expanded sample analysis, I use a multinomial logit similar to (19) that 
includes private health insurance as an additional choice outcome.  However, there are 
two major disadvantages with non-linear models.  First, it is practically difficult to 
estimate nonlinear models with fixed effects (they do not merge in Stata) and 
methodologically, the incidental parameters problem raises questions about the 
statistical properties of the estimators (Greene 2002).    Second, while the multionomial 
logit might be the more theoretically “correct” model, interpreting an interaction term 
with two continuous variables is not a straightforward process (See Ai and Norton 
2003).  In Chapter 5, I compare the OLS results with various non-linear models and find 
that the results are consistent and comparable. 
 I also explored potential private health insurance network effects by adding an 
additional network variable to the expanded sample in equation (19).  However, given 
the theory in Chapter 3 and the fact that my sample focuses on the Medicaid-eligible 
population, there is no a priori reason to believe that private health insurance defined 
networks will have an impact on the probability that an individual is insured.   The 
majority of the privately insured obtain coverage from their employers; networks can 
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either indirectly influence this choice through labor market decisions or directly through 
the choice of plan type once already employed, as shown in Sorenson (2003).  However, 
I do not have the data to explore these options and the private insurance network 
variable may suffer from multiple omitted variable biases, such as employer-offer 
status. In addition, some individuals may rely on networks to obtain information on 
health insurance products in the nongroup market.   However, coverage rates in the 
private nongroup are relatively small, especially among the low-income population.  
Overall, I find no statistically significant effects associated with the private health 
insurance network variable (results not shown).  
 
Interpretation 
This section describes how to interpret the coefficients obtained in equation 
(16). 18  This is not a straightforward process because the key variable of interest is the 
interaction between two continuous variables.  Using the same interpretation used in 
Bertrand et al. (2000) and Deri (2005),  can be viewed as a policy such that a 1-
percentage point increase in  leads to a 1-percentage point increase in Medicaid use in 
the absence of networks.  Changes in policy lead to a direct effect on Medicaid ( ) and 
an indirect effect via networks.  Intuitively, an increase in the policy variable  raises  
                                                          
18
 A parallel explanation can be used to interpret equation (19). 
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, which in turn raises each individual's Medicaid probability through a feedback 
or network effect.  Examples include a Medicaid eligibility expansion or a targeted 
advertising/outreach campaign designed to increased Medicaid take-up.   
Mathematically, averaging both sides (2) by language group k and differentiating 
with respect to  yields: 
 
 (19)  
Solving for the change in Medicaid use for each language group for a policy 
change t and subtracting 1 for the direct effect yields: 
 
 (20)  
Overall, the multiplier effect is stronger (positive or negative) for higher average 
levels of contact availability and higher coefficients on the network variable.  If the 
coefficient on the network variable is negative, higher contact availability has as 
stronger negative effect on an individual’s probability of take-up, whereas if the 
coefficient on the network variable is positive, higher contact availability has as stronger 
positive effect on an individual’s probability of take-up.  The regression result tables in 
the next chapter include policy multiplier estimates for each OLS model and sub-sample. 
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 The following chapter contains the results for all of the models described 
in this chapter and interprets the main variable of interest.  There are also a few 
additional sensitivity tests that were not mentioned in this chapter. 
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Figure 1: American Community Survey Question on Health Insurance 
                        
                        
Is this person CURRENTLY covered by any of the following types of health insurance or 
health coverage plans? Mark "Yes" or "No" for EACH type of coverage in items a – h. 
a. Insurance through a current or former employer or union (of this person or 
another family member)   
b. Insurance purchased directly from an insurance company (by this person or 
another family member)   
c. Medicare, for people 65 and older, or people with certain 
disabilities         
d. Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or any kind of government-assistance plan for those 
with low incomes or a disability 
e. TRICARE or other military health 
care               
f. VA (including those who have ever used or enrolled for VA 
health care)         
g. Indian Health 
Service                   
h. Any other type of health insurance or health coverage 
plan – Specify         
                        
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2008-2009. 
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Figure 2: Details of the IPUMS Health Insurance Edits 
                        
*Persons who did not claim to be covered by Medicaid were assigned Medicaid 
coverage if they were: 
1. Less than 19 years old and the unmarried child of a parent with public assistance 
and/or Medicaid;  
2. A citizen parent with public assistance; 
3. A citizen parent married to a citizen with public assistance and/or Medicaid; 
4. A foster child; or                   
5. A Supplemental Security Income (SSI) enrollee living in a state where SSI enrollees 
are automatically enrolled in Medicaid and who satisfies one of the following three 
additional conditions: 
Does not have children 
Has children but is disabled and/or not working 
Group quarters resident. 
*Persons who did not claim to be covered by Medicare were assigned Medicare 
coverage if they were at least 65 years old and satisfied at least one of the following 
conditions: 
1. Reported Social Security or Railroad Retirement Benefits 
2. Reported Medicaid coverage. 
*Persons who did not claim to be covered by TRICARE or other military insurance were 
assigned such coverage if they were: 
1. Active duty military; 
2. The spouse of an active duty military person and did not report other private 
coverage; or 
3. Less than 21 years old, lacking in other private coverage, and the unmarried child of 
an active duty military person. 
*Persons who gave direct reports (i.e., unallocated) of employer-based, privately 
purchased, military, Medicaid, and Medicare coverage had: 
*VA coverage changed to "No" if the person was not a veteran; and 
*IHS coverage changed to "No" if the person did not identify American Indian / Alaska 
Native as their only race. 
Notes:                       
(1) IPUMS-USA, Health Insurance Variables in the American Community Survey, 
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/acs_healthins.shtml.  Accessed on February 23rd, 2011. 
(2) Lynch V, Bourdreaux m, and Davern M. Applying and Evaluating Logical Coverage 
Edits to Health Insurance Coverage in the American Community Survey. Suitland (MD): 
U.S. Census Bureau, July 2010. 
(3) Unless otherwise noted, "parent" refers to a person with a child under age 18. 
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Figure 3 
2008-2009 Medicaid Income Limits as a Percent of FPL 
              
    
Parents 
  
Childless 
Adults   
Children 
(2008/2009) 
Alabama   24%   N/A   200% 
Alaska   81%   N/A   175% 
Arizona   106%   110%   200% 
Arkansas   200%   200%   200% 
California   106%   N/A   250% 
Colorado   66%   N/A   205% 
Connecticut   300%   300%   300% 
Delaware   121%   110%   200% 
DC   207%   211%   300% 
Florida   53%   N/A   200% 
Georgia   50%   N/A   235% 
Hawaii   200%   200%   300% 
Idaho   185%   185%   185% 
Illinois   185%   N/A   200% 
Indiana   200%   200%   250% 
Iowa   250%   250%   200%/300% 
Kansas   32%   N/A   241% 
Kentucky   62%   N/A   200% 
Louisiana   25%   N/A   250% 
Maine   300%   300%   200% 
Maryland   116%   116%   300% 
Massachusetts   300%   300%   300% 
Michigan   64%   45%   200% 
Minnesota   275%   250%   280% 
Mississippi   44%   N/A   200% 
Missouri   25%   N/A   300% 
Montana   56%   N/A   175% 
Nebraska   58%   N/A   185% 
Nevada   200%   N/A   200% 
New Hampshire 49%   N/A   300% 
New Jersey   200%   N/A   350% 
New Mexico   250%   250%   235% 
New York   150%   100%   400% 
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North Carolina   49%   N/A   200% 
North Dakota   59%   N/A   160% 
Ohio   90%   N/A   200% 
Oklahoma   200%   200%   185% 
Oregon   185%   185%   300% 
Pennsylvania   208%   213%   300% 
Rhode   181%   N/A   250% 
South Carolina   89%   N/A   200% 
South Dakota   52%   N/A   200% 
Tennessee   129%   129%   250% 
Texas   26%   N/A   200% 
Utah   150%   150%   200% 
Vermont   300%   300%   300% 
Virginia   29%   N/A   200% 
Washington   200%   200%   250%/300% 
West Virginia   33%   N/A   220%/250% 
Wisconsin   200%   200%   300% 
Wyoming   52%   N/A   200% 
              
Sources: (1) Kaiser Family Foundation, statehealthfacts.org (2) Cohen 
Ross, Jarlenski, Artiga, and Marks (2009) 
Note: Thresholds are the maximum among Medicaid or Medicaid look-
alike programs, programs more limited than Medicaid, and premium 
assistance with work-related eligibility requirements. 
 
 
  
 73 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
State-Level Data for Sensitivity Analyses 
    
 
  
State 
Medicaid Fee 
Indexes for All 
Services 
(2008)   
Has Outreach in 
Multiple 
Languages 
(2007)? 
        
US 1.00     
        
Alabama   1.10   No 
Alaska 2.05   Yes 
Arizona 1.45   Yes 
Arkansas 1.10   Yes 
California  0.83   Yes 
Colorado 1.19   No 
Connecticut 1.44   Yes 
Delaware 1.44   No 
District of Columbia 0.87   Yes 
Florida  0.89   Yes 
Georgia 1.21   Yes 
Hawaii 1.04   No 
Idaho 1.33   No 
Illinois 0.90   Yes 
Indiana 0.90   No 
Iowa 1.22   No 
Kansas 1.20   Yes 
Kentucky 1.10   No 
Louisiana  1.24   Yes 
Maine 0.81   Yes 
Maryland 1.27   Yes 
Massachusetts 1.30   Yes 
Michigan 0.90   Yes 
Minnesota 0.98   No 
Mississippi 1.14   No 
Missouri 0.94   No 
Montana  1.33   No 
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Nebraska 1.24   Yes 
Nevada 1.46   Yes 
New Hampshire 0.98   No 
New Jersey 0.58   No 
New Mexico 1.42   Yes 
New York 0.62   No 
North Carolina 1.27   Yes 
North Dakota 1.30   Yes 
Ohio 0.94   Yes 
Oklahoma 1.28   No 
Oregon 1.18   No 
Pennsylvania 0.98   Yes 
Rhode Island 0.59   Yes 
South Carolina 1.24   No 
South Dakota 1.19   Yes 
Tennessee N/A   Yes 
Texas 1.01   Yes 
Utah  1.08   Yes 
Vermont 1.25   Yes 
Virginia 1.23   No 
Washington 1.28   Yes 
West Virginia 1.12   No 
Wisconsin 1.07   Yes 
Wyoming 1.81   No 
        
Source: Zuckerman et al. (2009); Hill et al. (2009) 
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Chapter 5: Results 
5A.  Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1A shows weighted descriptive statistics for the core and expanded adult 
samples.  Overall, there are 59,377 unweighted adults (7,755,281 weighted) in the core 
sample and 83,906 unweighted adults (10,786,093) in the expanded sample.   Overall, a 
non-trivial proportion of the sample has access to private health insurance:  36.7% of 
the core sample has Medicaid and 63.3% is uninsured, whereas 26.4% of the expanded 
sample has Medicaid, 28.1% has any private coverage, and 45.5% is uninsured.  Relative 
to the core sample, the expanded sample includes a higher proportion of adults with at 
least some college education (30.5% vs. 23.6%), a lower proportion of Hispanics (65.4% 
vs. 71.4%), and a lower proportion of individuals with family income below the poverty 
rate (61.8% vs. 68.7%).   
 Table 1B is the child equivalent to Table 1A.  The child sample is substantially 
larger than the adult sample because Medicaid/CHIP eligibility rules are more generous 
for children.   There are 136,542 unweighted children (17,459,492 weighted) in the core 
sample and 192,414 unweighted children (24,047,763) in the expanded sample.  Overall, 
children have higher rates of Medicaid coverage compared to the adult samples:  71.6% 
of the core child sample has Medicaid and 28.4% is uninsured, and 52% of the expanded 
child sample has Medicaid, 27.4% has any private coverage, and 20.6% is uninsured.  In 
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addition, consistent with the statistics in Table 1A, the expanded child sample has higher 
levels of education (defined at the family-level) and income compared to the core child 
sample.   
 Appendix 1A and 1B include the same descriptive statistics for the adult and 
child expanded samples, but broken out type of health insurance coverage.  There are 
considerable differences in observable characteristics among the different coverage 
categories.  One interesting thing to note is that those with private non-group coverage 
look more similar, on average, to those with employer-sponsored insurance.  However, 
Lynch et al. (2010) finds that there might be considerable measurement error in private 
non-group coverage e.g., respondent confusion between Medicaid and private-
nongroup, which is supported by the fact some individuals report having non-group 
coverage even though it is most likely “unaffordable” given their low income levels.  
These tables provide some insight into the differences between the core and expanded 
sample and help explain some of differences in the regression results discussed in the 
next section.   
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study includes both citizens and non-
citizens in the sample (non-citizens are dropped in a sensitivity analysis), even though 
most immigrants are subject to a five-year ban on eligibility and undocumented 
immigrants are generally ineligible.  Legal permanent residents are ineligible for 
Medicaid/CHIP during their first five years in the U.S. and become eligible afterwards if 
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they meet the programs’ other eligibility requirements.  However, some immigrants 
(e.g., refugees and humanitarian immigrants) are exempt from the bar and are eligible 
for Medicaid/CHIP regardless of their length of residence and 17 states and D.C. have 
used state funds to provide coverage to recent immigrants who would otherwise be 
ineligible.  The decision to include non-citizens had a larger impact on the adult sample 
sizes compared to the child samples:  56.1% of adults in the core sample are non-
citizens (52.2% in the expanded sample) and only 14.1% of children in the core sample 
are non-citizens (12.8% in the expanded sample).  As a result of this generous definition 
of eligibility, the sample provides an upper-bound on the number of individuals who are 
eligible for Medicaid by including some individuals who are technically not eligible due 
to their immigration status.   
 Table 2 compares Medicaid coverage rates between citizens and non-citizens in 
the adult and child core samples.   As expected, given the eligibility rules, citizens have 
higher Medicaid coverage rates than non-citizens.  23.6% of non-citizen adults and 39% 
of non-citizen children have Medicaid compared to 53.3% and 76.9% of adult and child 
citizens, respectively.  There are only small differences Medicaid coverage rates among 
non-citizen immigrants who have been in the country for less than 5 years (those that 
should have a higher proportion ineligible for Medicaid) compared to those who have 
been in the U.S. for 5 to 10 years.  However, there is a spike in Medicaid coverage 
among adults who have been in the U.S. for 5 years compared to those who have been 
 78 
 
 
 
in the U.S. for only 4 years, which is consistent with the eligibility rules described in the 
prior paragraph.  Figure 1 shows a plot of this data and bootstrap results show that 
there is a statistically significant discontinuity at the 5 year mark in the U.S. 
(coefficient=.0468, bootstrap standard error=.0015, p-value=.002).  These results can be 
further explored in future research.   
 Tables 3A and 3B highlight the differences across language groups in the core 
adult and child samples, respectively.19  Medicaid take-up for an individual’s language 
group as a whole, interacted with the contact availability, is the key independent 
variable of interest in this paper.  As such, it is necessary to have sufficient variation in 
Medicaid take-up across language groups to identify network heterogeneity; variation in 
take-up across language groups proxies for the inherent differences in preferences and 
attitudes towards health insurance across language groups, as determined by culture, 
experiences with government insurance in one’s native country, etc…In both the adult 
and child samples, Yiddish speakers have the highest (over 90%) and Pennsylvania Dutch 
have the lowest (under 10%) Medicaid take-up rates among all language groups.  As 
discussed in the next section, the results are insensitive to including or excluding these 
groups.  Table 3A shows that Medicaid take-up rates among the other language in the 
adult core sample vary widely, ranging from 74% among Cantonese, 68% among 
Armenian, and 67% among Bengali speakers to 22% among Korean, 21% among 
                                                          
19
 It is important to note that some language groups have small sample size (e.g., Hungarian), but the 
language group as a whole has at least 1,000 unweighted individuals in the ACS during each data year. 
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Japanese, and 14% among Dutch speakers.  The Medicaid take-up among Spanish 
speakers, who comprise 73% of the sample, is near the low end at 33%.  Table 3B also 
shows that Medicaid/CHIP take-up rates in the child core sample (where the language 
group is defined by the language that the child’s mother speaks at home) vary widely, 
ranging from 93% among Hungarian, 90% among Miao/Hmong, and 89% among Hebrew 
speakers to 48% among Korean, 39% among German, 18% among Dutch speakers.  
Spanish speakers comprise 81% of the core child sample and have a take-up rate of 72%.   
 Appendix 2A and Appendix 2B contain the same information for the expanded 
adult and child samples.  These tables contain an additional column indicating the rate 
of private health insurance for each language group.  With a few exceptions, the 
ordering of language groups by proportion covered by Medicaid is consistent with the 
ordering in Tables 2A and 2B.  However, there is considerable variation in private health 
insurance rates across language groups.  For example, 69% of adult Japanese speakers 
have private health insurance compared to 23% of Spanish speakers and 14% of Navajo 
speakers.  Similar trends prevail in the expanded child sample.   
 The regression models in the next section handle the privately insured in the 
expanded sample in two ways.  First, I estimate the same OLS model used for the core 
sample, but change the dependent variable to “any insurance” as opposed to Medicaid 
take-up.  This model determines the effect of Medicaid network variable on the 
probability of obtaining any insurance type, which can include Medicaid, employer-
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sponsored insurance (ESI), and private non-group.  However, given the theoretical 
mechanisms described in Chapter 3 and the results shown among the core sample, any 
measurable effect of networks on “any insurance” should primarily be attributable to 
the Medicaid take-up effect.  I verify this by estimating a more theoretically sound 
model (multinomial logit) that explicitly incorporates the choice of any private health 
insurance relative to the other insurance outcomes.20  The tradeoffs associated with 
using the multinomial logit versus OLS are discussed in Chapter 4. 
Contact availability, defined by equation (18) in Chapter 4, is the other key 
variable that comprises the network effect.21  Tables 4A and 4B provide the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of various specifications of the contact 
availability variable.  The main specification, which has a log transformation and adjusts 
for the under-weighting of small language groups, is in the first three rows in each table.  
Average contact availability defined at the PUMA-level has a higher mean and standard 
deviation compared to contact availability defined at the Super-PUMA and MSA level, 
implying that non-English speakers are more densely populated in smaller geographic 
areas.  The bottom three rows of 4A and 4B contain the sensitivity specifications of 
contact availability.  By removing the denominator, contact availability approaches zero 
for more individuals in the sample, and hence the average natural log of contact 
                                                          
20
 I also estimate models with any private is separated into ESI and private non-group. 
21
 As a reminder: The numerator for the contact availability measure in equation (4)  is the share of the 
population in area j that are part of language group k and the denominator is the share of the total United 
States’ population that is part of language group k.  This variable is then log transformed. 
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availability becomes negative.  By removing the log transformation, contact availability 
becomes heavily skewed and has substantially larger range and standard deviation. 
 Finally, Table 5, along with Figure 2 and Figure 3, provide a more detailed picture 
on where adults and children in the sample live and the role of contact availability.  
Table 5 shows the state distribution of the core adult and child samples.  More than half 
of Medicaid eligible adults that speak a non-English language at home live in 5 states:  
California (18.0%), New York (16.3), Arizona (6.0%), Massachusetts (6.0%), and Illinois 
(5.4%).  In addition, more than half of Medicaid/CHIP eligible children that speak a non-
English language at home live in 3 states: California (26.7%), Texas (18.4%), and New 
York (8.4%).  Given the fact that the sample size in many states (e.g., Wyoming, West 
Virginia, South Dakota, North Dakota, etc…) is extremely low, Medicaid take-up for each 
language group is defined at the national level as opposed to the state or local level.  
Even without the sample size constraint, defining language group take-up at a local area 
level would most likely capture unobservable differences across areas as opposed to 
preferences and information that the language group as a whole possesses.     
 Figure 2 and Figure 3 show heat maps of the proportion of PUMAs that speak 
Spanish in the household for California and New York, respectively22.  These maps 
provide some insight into how contact availability works:  for each individual in a given 
PUMA, contact availability is a function of the proportion of the PUMA population that 
                                                          
22
 I would like to Thank Michael Huntress for his assistance in producing these maps. 
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speaks their common language.   These maps provide a good visual snapshot because of 
the large share of the sample that speaks Spanish and live in New York or California.  In 
both maps, the cutoffs for each color code correspond to the quartile distribution of 
PUMAs.  For example, a quarter of PUMAs in California have between 36.6% and 81.7% 
of the population speaking Spanish in the household.  There are two major common 
trends in these maps.  First, there are high concentrations of Spanish speakers in Urban 
centers, such as New York City and Los Angeles.  Most of the PUMAs outside of New 
York City have a relatively low proportion of Spanish speakers, with more urban areas 
such as Rochester and Syracuse being the exception.  In contrast, California as a whole is 
more heavily concentrated with Spanish speakers.  Most of the PUMAs in the lowest 
quartile are in sparsely populated areas, such as mountainous PUMAs in the north or 
the Mojave Desert towards the east.  Second, there is considerable variation across the 
PUMAs within a given city.  For example, within New York City, there are 3 PUMAs in 
Staten Island that have different proportions of Spanish speakers.  There is also 
considerable variation between the Bronx (high proportion of Spanish speakers 
throughout) and Manhattan (mixed proportions). 
 
5B.  Regression Results 
Illustrative Example 
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The main variable of interest is not very intuitive to interpret because it is an 
interaction between two continuous variables.  An easier way to understand how the 
variable works is to create two binary variables (low vs. high take-up group and low vs. 
high contact availability) and divide the sample into four groups: Individuals from low 
and high Medicaid take-up language groups living in low and high contact availability 
areas, where the low/high cutoff for each variable is determined by the mean level.    
Using these binary variables instead of the continuous variables, one can view the 
results under the framework of a difference-in-differences (DD) model (this example 
uses unconditional means, but the results for regression-adjusted means are 
consistent).   The goal of this exercise is to show the differential effect of living in high 
contact availability areas for individuals from low and high Medicaid take-up language 
groups or in other words, determine if living in a high contact availability area increases 
the probability of Medicaid take-up more for individuals that are part of higher Medicaid 
take-up language groups.  Table 6 shows the DD estimates of unconditional means for 
the adult and child core samples.    For individuals in the adult sample that are part of a 
low Medicaid take-up language group, the differential effect on Medicaid take-up of 
living in a high contact availability area relative to a low contact availability area is .070.  
However, the differential effect (.165) is higher for adults that are part of a high 
Medicaid take-up language group.  The DD estimates for children are more succinct:  
living in a high contact availability area for those that are part of low take-up language 
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groups has a negative effect (-.0580) on the individual’s probability of taking up 
Medicaid, whereas living in a high contact availability area for those that are part of high 
take-up language groups has a positive effect (.0582) on an individual’s probability of 
taking-up Medicaid.  The overall DD estimate is .116 and is statistically significant at the 
1% level.   
 
Main Results 
 
 Table 7A and Table 7B compare the full regression results from the core and 
expanded sample OLS models.  I estimated robust standard errors for all OLS models, 
although they are not shown in these two tables for sake of space.  The core and 
expanded samples in Tables 7A/7B include PUMA and language group fixed effects, 
contact availability is defined at the PUMA level, Medicaid take-up at the language 
group level is defined among those in the sample, and robust standard errors are cluster 
corrected by PUMA and language group.  The dependent variable in the “naïve” models 
and the core sample is a 0/1 indicator for Medicaid take-up, whereas the dependent 
variable in the expanded sample is a 0/1 indicator for having any health insurance type.  
Language group, PUMA, and occupation dummies are not shown, but are available upon 
request.  The coefficients and significance levels for all other covariates are displayed in 
Tables 7A/7B.  
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Before discussing the main variable of interest, it is important to note that the 
covariates in Tables 7A and 7B have the signs that we would expect to see among the 
samples a priori.  For both adults and children, being a non-citizen decreases the 
probability of taking-up Medicaid or having any health insurance, while being female 
increases the probability of take-up.  Both of these results could be partially explained 
by both exogenous factors (e.g., the relationship between Medicaid eligibility and 
citizenship status and pregnancy status) and endogenous factors (e.g., non-citizens lack 
access or information related to coverage and women in the sample have a higher 
expected benefits associated with insurance).  In addition, older adults and younger 
children are more likely to have Medicaid or any coverage relative to their counterparts 
and Hispanics are less likely to have Medicaid or any coverage relative to whites.  
English fluency, welfare use, and number of disabilities also has a positive impact on the 
probability take-up and having coverage.  Another interesting pattern is that in the core 
sample, adults with higher levels of education and income are less likely to take-up 
Medicaid and are more likely to remain uninsured.  In contrast, the signs flip in the 
expanded sample and those with higher levels of education and income are more likely 
to have any insurance type.  This is due to the fact that the expanded sample includes 
those with private health insurance, which is positively correlated with higher levels of 
education and income. 
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 The two columns in Tables 7A/7B display the main coefficients of interest and 
correspond to equations (16) and (19) in Chapter 4 for the core and expanded samples, 
respectively.  For adults, the coefficient on the main network variable (take-up rate of 
language group*contact availability) is .100 for the core sample and .118 in the 
expanded sample, and for kids, the network coefficients are .071 and .100.  All four 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and provide strong evidence for 
the existence of language and geography-defined network effects.  By including 
neighborhood and language group fixed effects, these models address any biases 
associated with omitted neighborhood characteristics and omitted language group 
characteristics that could potentially be correlated with the network variable.  In 
addition, the base effect for contact availability controls for any unobservable individual 
characteristics that could be correlated with network size.   
These results imply that for a policy change that increases Medicaid take-up by 1 
percentage point, the network will increase the probability of taking-up Medicaid in 
these language groups by 9.9 percentage points for adults and 7.4 percentage points for 
kids.  In the expanded sample, for a policy change that increases Medicaid take-up by 1 
percentage point, the network will increase the probability of having any health 
insurance in these language groups by 11.0 percentage points for adults and 10.4 
percentage points for kids.  The remainder of this chapter addresses specific 
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identification issues, potential mechanisms associated language-geography networks, 
and various sensitivity analyses.   
It is important to note that when I used the child’s language spoken at home to 
define networks, I found relatively weak evidence of network effects among 
Medicaid/CHIP eligible children.  There was also a much smaller sample as children are 
more likely to speaker English at home (results not shown).  However, Table 7B and the 
other tables in this section show that the results are greatly strengthened when the 
mother’s language is used to define networks. 
  
Addressing Differential Selection and Identifying Network Mechanisms 
 
 Chapter 4 described how this there could be potential for differential geographic 
sorting, where people who live in areas of high density of their language group are 
different in some unobservable way from people who live in low density areas, but in a 
way that is correlated with health insurance rates.  In other words, there could still be 
omitted individual characteristics that are correlated with the key network variable.  In 
preliminary results for this paper, I addressed this problem by using the network and 
contact availability variables constructed at the larger MSA levels as instrumental 
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variables (IVs) for the same variables constructed at the more detailed PUMA level.23  A 
necessary condition for this model is that the MSA IVs need to be highly correlated with 
the PUMA-level variables. In addition, the IV model must assume that MSA location is 
exogenous, whereas exact location within the MSA (e.g., PUMA) can be a choice 
variable that can be biased due to differential sorting.  If differential sorting is driving 
the results, the OLS estimates are biased upwards relative to the IV estimates.  In 
contrast, comparable OLS and IV estimates provide evidence that differential sorting is 
not driving the main results.  The null hypothesis that these two instruments are jointly 
zero in the first stage was easily rejected:  In preliminary core model results, the joint F-
statistic was 56,794 (p-value=0.000) for the network variable first stage regression and 
43,045 (p-value=0.000) for the contact availability variable first stage regression.  In 
addition, the magnitude and statistical significance of the network IV was nearly 
identical to the main OLS result.   
 The first three columns of Table 8A (adults) and Table 8B (children) compare the 
core and expanded models defined with PUMA variables24, Super-PUMA variables, and 
MSA variables.  Given the preliminary results discussed above, comparing the 
coefficients of these models, without using the IV approach, provides a comparable 
                                                          
23
 This method was used by Bertrand et al. (2000) and Deri (2005).  Other network papers use similar 
approaches. 
24
 These are the same core and expanded model results displayed in 7A and 7B. 
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level of precision.25  The Super-PUMA model (model 2) includes Super-PUMA fixed 
effects as opposed to PUMA fixed effects and defines contact availability within the 
larger Super-PUMA as opposed to the PUMA area.  Model 3 does the same thing at the 
MSA-level, but excludes individuals who live in non-MSAs and do not have MSA 
identifiers.  The coefficients across all three models are similar (within approximately 1 
standard error of the average) and for the most part, the estimated coefficients in the 
Super-PUMA and MSA models are slightly higher than the coefficients in the PUMA 
model.  However, the policy multiplier effect is either the same or slightly larger in the 
PUMA models because contact availability levels is larger in the PUMA compared to the 
super-PUMA and MSA.  If differential geographic selection were driving the results, we 
would expect to see substantially stronger network effects in the PUMA model, as 
individuals would select across PUMAs within a given super-PUMA or MSA in the 
manner described above.  Given the fact that these estimates are so similar, it appears 
that differential selection cannot the main driving force behind the main results. 
 The remaining models in Table 8A provide additional evidence against 
differential sorting and show that recent immigrants are more likely to rely on language 
group networks.  Models 4 and 5 limit the sample to foreign born adults and model 6 
only includes the non-foreign born population.  Model 5 also includes years since entry 
in the U.S. (YSE) dummies and interactions terms between YSE and language group.  This 
                                                          
25
 I would like to thank Jeremy Tobacman for this suggestion. 
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model provides additional controls for the omitted variable biases associated with 
immigrant behavior e.g., over time, immigrants start to relocate in a way that is 
consistent with differential sorting.  In both the core and expanded adult samples, the 
network coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level among the foreign born 
population and is statistically insignificant among the U.S. born population.  To further 
investigate, I separated the foreign born population by number of years in the U.S..  
Models 7, 8, and 9 show that the network effect is substantially stronger among recent 
immigrants compared to those who have been in the country for five or more years.  In 
addition, the results show stronger network effects that those who have been in the 
U.S. for two years or less compared to those who have been in the U.S. for five years or 
less.  This key result provides not only provides evidence against differential sorting, but 
also shows how recent immigrants are more likely to rely on networks to receive 
information related to the language group’s valuation or preferences towards Medicaid.   
 The foreign born results for the child sample (Table 8B) are a bit misleading.  The 
results imply that there are stronger network effects among children born in the U.S. as 
opposed to foreign born children in the core sample, whereas the network effects are 
stronger among foreign born and recent immigrant children in the expanded sample.  It 
appears that this reversion across samples is due to the inclusion of those with private 
non-group insurance coverage:  Language-defined Medicaid networks have a positive 
effect on having non-group coverage among the foreign born population in the 
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expanded sample, which in turn has a positive impact on the probability of have any 
health insurance coverage.  This result can be attributable to two factors.  First, there is 
considerable measurement error associated with the private non-group health 
insurance variable and parents confuse private non-group with a state Medicaid/CHIP 
plan.  Second, it is possible that those with private non-group in the expanded child 
sample are actually covered by non-group and are technically ineligible for Medicaid 
due to their immigration status.  Networks inform these individuals on the value of 
being insured, but since they are ineligible for public insurance, the newly acquired 
information increases the individual’s probability of seeking out health insurance 
through the private non-group market. This is further explored in Table 19B with the 
multinomial logit model, and further research is needed to understand the underlying 
measurement error or behavioral mechanism.   
 The ACS also contains information on whether or not the person moved in the 
past year.  I find that adults who moved locations in the past year have comparable 
network effects as those who lived in the same house, but children who moved in the 
past year had substantially larger network effects than those who stayed in the same 
house. However, the network effects remain positive and significant at the 1% level, 
even after removing the “mover” population (whom account for approximately 1/6 of 
the sample).   A closer look at the data also shows that children who moved in the past 
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year were more likely to be in poverty and more likely to be foreign born compared to 
those who lived in the same house (data not shown).   
Tables 9A and 9B explore how network effects vary across levels of English 
fluency and health status.  In 9A, I find that network effects are slightly stronger for 
adults in linguistically isolated households compared to individuals that are not in 
linguistically isolated households.26  In contrast, among children (9B), the network 
coefficient is statistically significant in households that are not linguistically isolated, but 
insignificant among linguistically isolated households.  There are also no network effects 
associated with adults and children that live in group quarters (e.g., those in institutions 
or non-institution group quarters, but not living in a household), which provides internal 
validation to the model because most of these individuals have little contact with others 
that are part of their language group.  In addition, models 5 through 8 in Table 9A show 
that network effects are stronger among adults that are fluent in English relative to 
those that do not speak English or do not speak English well.  This result is inconsistent 
with the finding in Bertrand et al. (2000), where the authors found that networks effects 
are weaker for people speaking better English in the context of welfare participation.  
The result from this study could be explained by the fact those who speak a non-English 
language at home, but are also fluent in English, have a more information and a 
                                                          
26
 “Linguistically isolated households" are households in which either no person age 14+ speaks only 
English at home, or no person age 14+ who speaks a language other than English at home speaks English 
"Very well" (Ruggles et al. 2010). 
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thorough understanding of complexities associated with Medicaid eligibility and the 
take-up process relative to those who are not fluent in English.   In contrast, the welfare 
participation decision is relatively more simplistic compared to health insurance 
decision-making.  The results in the child sample, where English fluency is defined at the 
mother’s level, are fairly consistent with those in Table 9A.   
 Finally, the last two columns in 9A and 9B study whether networks are more 
important for individuals with a disability (respondent has serious difficulty hearing, 
seeing, concentrating/remembering/making decisions, walking or climbing stairs, 
dressing or bathing, or doing errands) compared to those without a disability.  I find that 
network effects are non-existent among the disabled population, which provides 
evidence against the alternative hypothesis that individuals sort by health status in a 
manner which is correlated with language-geography networks. 
 
Sample Sensitivity 
 The results in Table 10A and Table 10B show that the main results are relatively 
insensitive to various sample definitions.  These tables include 9 models among the child 
(Table 10A) and adult (Table 10B) core and expanded samples.  All of these models 
include PUMA and language group fixed effects and define contact availability at the 
PUMA-level.  MSA and Super-PUMA model results are consistent and are available upon 
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request.   All of the coefficients associated with the network variable in these models 
(with the sole exception being Model 5 for children) remain statistically significant at the 
1% level and have robust magnitudes: 
 Model 1: Main model (full results in 7A and 7B) 
 Model 2 and Model 3:  Sensitivity analysis over defining Medicaid/CHIP 
eligibility.  Model 2 defines individuals as Medicaid/CHIP eligible if their family 
income is below 200% FPL and Model 3 defines individuals as Medicaid/CHIP 
eligible if their family income is below 300% FPL.  These eligibility definitions are 
less precise, but the network effects are similar, but slightly stronger, compared 
to the main model. 
 Model 4: Exclude Spanish speakers.  All network effects are statistically 
significant and magnitudes are strong.  However, the coefficient on the network 
variable for non-Spanish children in the core sample is only significant at the 10% 
level.    
 Model 5: Spanish speakers only and network defined by country of birth.  This 
model addresses the concern that supply-side forces (e.g., differential outreach 
across PUMAs) are driving the main results.  Assuming that CMS does not 
differentially target individuals based on country of birth as opposed to language 
group, this alternative explanation cannot explain the results from this model.  
The results are positive and significant at the 1% level among adults, but are 
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statistically insignificant among the child sample, where country of birth is 
defined by the mother’s country of birth.  Further work is needed to explore the 
latter result, but this result could be explained by the fact that mother’s country 
of birth is a weaker and more arbitrary network definition compared to language 
spoken at home in terms of obtaining information related to health insurance.   
 Model 6: Exclude non-citizens.  The results are insensitive to including or 
excluding non-citizens.  I also found that that the coefficient on the network 
variable remains positive and statistically significant when immigrants who have 
been in the U.S. for less than 5 years, and live in states that do not have 
extended eligibility rules for this population, are excluded. 
 Model 7 and Model 8:  Exclude Yiddish and Pennsylvania Dutch speakers 
(potential outlier language groups).  The network effects are slightly stronger 
after making these sample restrictions. 
 Model 9: Exclude California and New York.   As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
California and New York are two of the largest states in terms of sample size and 
could potentially devote more resources to outreach efforts.  The results remain 
statistically significant at the 1% level after removing individuals who live in 
these states.  However, the policy multiplier among the adult sample is slightly 
lower due to lower levels of contact availability in the states besides California 
and New York.   
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Local Area Characteristics 
 
 Table 11A and Table 11B compare the main PUMA fixed effects model with 
various models that replace fixed effects with PUMA characteristics.  I use the 
percentage of the PUMA that is non-white, the percent of the PUMA under 100% FPL, 
the average age in the PUMA, and the percent of the PUMA that is foreign born as 
neighborhood characteristics.  In column 2, I include all four characteristics in the model 
and find that the network variable remains positive and significant at the 1% level.   In 
the child model (11B), I find that the network coefficient in this model is stronger in 
magnitude compared to the fixed effects model, which indicates that the fixed effects 
are capturing some unobservable differences across PUMAs.  However, tests indicate 
that there is significant multicollinearity when all four characteristics are included in the 
model: The collinearity condition number for the four PUMA variables is 46.8 in the 
adult sample and 44.9 in the child sample.  As an alternative, I add one variable at a time 
and find that the coefficient on the network variable remains consistent throughout.  In 
addition, the coefficients on the PUMA characteristic variables imply that all four 
characteristics are positively correlated with an individual’s probability of taking-up 
Medicaid.  Tables 12 through 14 explore the strength of networks across various local 
area (PUMA-defined) characteristics. 
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 Tables 12A and 12B analyze how PUMA-level poverty levels relate to the 
strength of networks.  I divide both the core and expanded adult samples for adults 
(12A) and children (12B) into quintiles based on the average poverty ratio in the PUMA, 
where the 1st quintile includes individuals in the lowest income PUMAs and the 5th 
quintile includes those living in the highest income PUMAs.  For adults, I find that 
network effects, based on the policy multiplier, are stronger lower income 
neighborhoods.  I also find no network effect in the 5th quintile group in the core 
sample.  For children, the trend is inconsistent in the core sample, but the policy 
multiplier effects are stronger in the lower PUMA income groups.   
 Tables 13A and 13B provide some evidence that network effects are stronger in 
smaller geographic PUMAs.  I divided the sample into five quintiles based on total land 
area of the PUMA in square meters, where the 1st quintile includes individuals in the 
smallest PUMAs and the 5th quintile includes individuals in the largest PUMAs.  A priori, 
one would expect that network effects would be larger in smaller geographic areas 
because individuals are more likely to have encounters (e.g., conversations at the 
grocery store or the smaller downtown area) with those others who are included in the 
contact availability measure.  For adults (13A), I find positive and significant network 
effects among the smallest three quintile groups and statistically insignificant effects 
among the highest two quintile groups across both the core and expanded samples.  
Once again, the patterns among the child samples are odd:  There are positive and 
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significant effects among the 3rd quintile group only in the core sample, and positive and 
significant effects among all five quintile groups in the expanded sample with no 
discernable pattern in terms of magnitude.   However, there is some measurement error 
in the PUMA size variable because it is based on the geographic size of the PUMA in 
2000.27  The geographic size of the PUMA changes over time because PUMAs are 
defined by the number of people that live in the area.  This could partially explain some 
of the confusing patterns found in the child sample results. 
 The last PUMA-area characteristic that I explored is foreign born population.  I 
would expect that network effects would be stronger in neighborhoods that have a 
higher proportion of the population that is foreign born. Once again, I divided the 
sample into quintile groups with the 1st quintile corresponding to individuals in PUMAs 
with a low foreign born population as a percent of the total area population.  Practically, 
this is very similar to dividing the sample based on the average levels of contact 
availability because average contact availability substantially increases as the percent of 
the PUMA that is foreign born increases.  For adults (14A), I find that network policy 
multiplier effect is 31.5 percentage points among the highest quintile group in the core 
sample.  The coefficient on the network variable is statistically insignificant among the 
other quintile groups.  In the expanded adult sample, I also find stronger network 
effects in PUMAs with a higher percentage of foreign born populations.  However, 
                                                          
27
 This is the most recent information on PUMA size that I can find.  I will update the results with new data 
if it becomes available. 
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smaller, but statistically significant (at the 10% level) network effects prevail in some of 
the lower quintile groups.  Once again, the results for the child sample (14B) are the 
opposite, as network effects are stronger in neighborhoods in the lowest foreign born 
quintile group.  This could be attributable to differences in income and other socio-
demographic characteristics among the adult and child sample because the adult 
sample has lower income levels due to differences in Medicaid income eligibility 
thresholds for adults and children. 
  
Networks and State Policy 
 
  
 The purpose of this section is to determine if network effects vary based on 
differences in state policy design.  As discussed in the previous chapter, I use an index 
for state Medicaid fee-for-service reimbursement levels to proxy for the generosity of 
state Medicaid benefits and access to care.  I also use an indicator for whether or not 
the state has outreach in multiple languages for pregnant women eligible for Medicaid 
to proxy for state outreach efforts.   
 For adults (Table 16A), I find some evidence that network effects are stronger in 
states that have less generous Medicaid fees, but comparable across multiple language 
outreach and non-outreach states.  The former result suggests that networks effects are 
stronger in states that have worse access to providers for the low-income Medicaid 
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population.  I find mixed results among the child samples (Table 16B).  Network effects 
appear stronger in states in the top 3 quintiles of Medicaid fee generosity.  However, 
this might be a weak proxy for access because this index does not incorporate 
Medicaid/CHIP managed care capitation payments, and approximately 50% of 
Medicaid/CHIP children are enrolled in a managed care plans compared to only 25% of 
adults (Kaiser Family Foundation 2007).28 
 
Specification Tests 
 
 The results in Tables 16, 17, 18, and 19 indicate that the main results from this 
study are insensitive to several variable and model definition specifications.  To 
summarize, the results in these tables show that results are relatively unaffected by the 
following choices: 
 The use of survey weights in the OLS regression model (Tables 16A/16B). 
 Defining Medicaid take-up at the state-level and Super-PUMA level, as 
opposed to the national level, for quality component of the network variable 
(Tables 16A/16B).    
 Removing the underweighting denominator component from the contact 
availability component of the network variable (Tables 16A/16B). 
                                                          
28
 http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=200&cat=4, accessed on March 27
th
, 2011. 
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 The use of logit and probit models, with PUMA characteristics and Super-
PUMA fixed effects (PUMA fixed effects models do not converge), as 
opposed to linear probability models  (Tables 17A/17B) 
 Placebo tests that change the left hand side variable to something (e.g., 
poverty level indicators, age, welfare take-up, and marital status) other than 
Medicaid take-up.  For the majority of models, the Medicaid network 
variable does not have a statistically significant effect on the placebo LHS 
variable and where it does, the magnitude is small.  This provides more 
confidence in the internal validity of the main network variable of interest 
(Tables 19A/19B). 
 The use of multinomial logit models for the expanded samples (Tables 
18A/18B). 
The last bullet warrants further discussion.    For the expanded adult sample 
(Table 18A), I ran three multinomial logit models with PUMA characteristics (PUMA and 
Super-PUMA fixed effects models do not converge) and language group fixed effects.  
The first two models include three choice outcomes, with non-group included in the 
private insurance choice in the first model and non-group combined with Medicaid in 
the second model.  The third model includes private non-group as separate choice.  For 
all models (the base choice is Medicaid), I find that the network variable has a negative 
effect on the probability of being uninsured relative to having Medicaid.  I also find that 
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this effect is larger when private non-group is combined with Medicaid.  This could be 
attributable to the fact that there is considerable measurement error among those who 
report having private non-group (they might actually have Medicaid) or the fact that 
some individuals (most likely healthy individuals who can “afford” a relatively expensive 
non-group policy) who are actually ineligible for Medicaid purchase a non-group policy 
as an alternative.  The latter point is supported by the fact that I found a positive and 
significant coefficient on the network variable for non-group vs. Medicaid choice among 
the foreign born subsample, but an insignificant coefficient among the non-foreign born 
population (results not shown). I also found similar results for the expanded child 
sample (Table 18B).   
 
Language Group Distributional Effects 
  
 Finally, Tables 20A and 20B explore whether network effects are stronger among 
language groups with initially high versus low take-up of Medicaid.  To address this area, 
I estimated the main regression as usual, but included language group take-up quintile 
dummies (instead of the continuous measure of take-up) interacted with the contact 
availability measure.   In addition, for this empirical test I defined language group take-
up at the state level (column 1) and the super-PUMA level (column 2) in order to create 
more balanced quintiles.  Otherwise, the abundance of Spanish speakers would 
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dominate a single quintile because take-up in the standard definition only varied across 
language groups.  For each model, I excluded individuals in state-language group or 
super PUMA-language group cells with sample sizes under 30 in order to obtain more 
precise take-up estimates.   For adults, this restriction reduced the sample size by 
approximately 8% in the state take-up models and over 25% in the super-PUMA models.  
For children, this restriction reduced the sample size by approximately 5% in the state 
take-up models and over 15% in the super-PUMA models.  Tables 20A and 20B report 
the sample sizes and the the four coefficients (the 3rd quintile group is the excluded 
category) of the newly defined key variables of interest. 
 In all of the adult and child models where language group take-up is defined at 
the state level, I find that living in a high CA area has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the individual’s probability of take-up among those who are in the 
top quintile take-up group relative to those who are in the 3rd quintile.  In three out of 
the four models (child expanded sample being the exception), I find that among those 
who are part of the lowest take-up quintile , living in a CA area has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on take-up compared to those in the 3rd quintile.  
 I find similar patterns, but with more varying results, when language group take-
up is defined at the Super-PUMA level.  For example, among adults, CA has a negative 
and statistically significant effect on take-up among the lowest quintile take-up group, 
but no effect among the highest take-up group.  Among children in the expanded 
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sample, there are statistically significant effects among both the top (positive) and 
bottom (negative) quintile groups.  Among children in the core sample, there are 
positive and statistically significant effects among both the top quintile group.   
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Table 1A 
Weighted Descriptive Statistics 
Core vs. Expanded Adult Sample 
    
  
Core Sample Expanded Sample 
    Unweighted N 
 
59,377 83,906 
    Weighted N 
 
7,755,281 10,786,093 
    Health Insurance Status 
   Medicaid 
 
36.7% 26.4% 
Any Private 
 
0.0% 28.1% 
Uninsured 
 
63.3% 45.5% 
    Foreign born 
 
77.2% 75.5% 
    Fluent in English 
 
54.3% 60.0% 
    Non-Citizen 
 
56.1% 52.2% 
    MSA Status 
   Non-MSA 
 
9.3% 9.3% 
MSA not identifiable 
 
3.3% 3.6% 
MSA, central city 
 
33.3% 32.4% 
MSA, outside central city 
 
24.4% 25.2% 
MSA, central city status unknown 29.7% 29.5% 
    Female 
 
55.3% 54.6% 
    Age 
   Age, 19-24 
 
14.2% 15.6% 
Age, 25-34 
 
31.4% 29.8% 
Age, 35-44 
 
28.7% 28.7% 
Age, 45-54 
 
16.8% 17.0% 
Age, 55-64 
 
8.9% 8.9% 
    Education 
   < High school 
 
50.0% 43.4% 
High school graduate 
 
26.4% 26.1% 
Some college 
 
16.7% 20.1% 
College+ 
 
6.9% 10.4% 
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    Race and Ethnicity 
   White, non-Hispanic 
 
12.2% 14.9% 
Black, non-Hispanic 
 
3.4% 3.8% 
Asian, non-Hispanic 
 
10.4% 13.5% 
Hispanic 
 
71.4% 65.4% 
Other and multiple races 
 
2.6% 2.4% 
    Married 
 
50.8% 51.3% 
    Family size 
 
3.7 3.6 
    Number of own children in family 
 
1.6 1.6 
    Income Relative to Poverty 
   <=100% FPL 
 
68.7% 61.8% 
101-200% FPL 
 
28.2% 32.4% 
201-300% FPL 
 
3.2% 5.8% 
    Work Status 
   Worker, not self-employed 
 
61.2% 65.6% 
Worker, self-employed 
 
8.9% 8.0% 
Non-worker 
 
29.9% 26.4% 
    Has Welfare Income 
 
6.6% 5.2% 
    Number of disabilities 
 
0.23 0.20 
    Year 2009 
 
53.5% 52.5% 
       
Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys 
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Table 1B 
Weighted Descriptive Statistics 
Core vs. Expanded Children Sample 
    
  
Core Sample Expanded Sample 
    Unweighted N 
 
136,542 192,414 
    Weighted N 
 
17,459,492 24,047,763 
    Health Insurance Status 
   Medicaid 
 
71.6% 52.0% 
Any Private 
 
0.0% 27.4% 
Uninsured 
 
28.4% 20.6% 
    Foreign born 
 
17.3% 16.5% 
    Fluent in English 
 
65.4% 67.7% 
    Non-Citizen 
 
14.1% 12.8% 
    MSA Status 
   Non-MSA 
 
8.3% 8.0% 
MSA not identifiable 
 
2.6% 2.6% 
MSA, central city 
 
27.1% 26.7% 
MSA, outside central city 
 
27.7% 29.7% 
MSA, central city status unknown 34.4% 33.1% 
    Female 
 
48.8% 48.9% 
    Age 
   Infant 
 
5.5% 5.1% 
Age, 1-5 
 
28.7% 27.3% 
Age, 6-19 
 
65.8% 67.5% 
    Number Family Members with At Least Some 
College 
   0 
 
66.2% 59.5% 
1 
 
24.1% 26.7% 
2+ 
 
9.7% 13.8% 
    Race and Ethnicity 
   White, non-Hispanic 
 
8.9% 11.2% 
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Black, non-Hispanic 
 
3.4% 3.9% 
Asian, non-Hispanic 
 
6.5% 8.5% 
Hispanic 
 
79.5% 74.3% 
Other and multiple races 
 
1.8% 2.1% 
    Family size 
 
5.0 4.9 
    Two-Parent Family 
 
65.1% 66.6% 
    Income Relative to Poverty 
   <=100% FPL 
 
50.9% 42.9% 
101-200% FPL 
 
41.9% 44.1% 
201-300% FPL 
 
6.7% 11.4% 
301%+ 
 
0.5% 1.6% 
    Number of Workers in Family 
   0 
 
7.1% 6.1% 
1 
 
44.6% 43.4% 
2+ 
 
48.3% 50.5% 
    
    Number of disabilities 
 
0.06 0.05 
    Year 2009 
 
52.6% 51.6% 
 Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys      
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Table 2 
Medicaid/CHIP Take-Up Rates by Citizenship Status and Number of Years in U.S. 
Core Adult and Children Samples 
        Adults   Children 
 
Citizens 
Non-
Citizens 
 
Citizens 
Non-
Citizens 
      Overall 53.3% 23.6% 
 
76.9% 39.0% 
      Years in U.S. 
     Not Foreign Born 49.8% N/A 
 
77.0% N/A 
<1 56.8% 19.2% 
 
64.1% 33.8% 
1 62.8% 21.6% 
 
76.3% 39.5% 
2 58.0% 20.7% 
 
77.5% 37.3% 
3 64.4% 20.4% 
 
74.2% 38.9% 
4 48.3% 20.2% 
 
70.1% 41.8% 
5 59.0% 24.3% 
 
69.6% 41.8% 
6 50.4% 19.7% 
 
70.4% 39.9% 
7 58.6% 18.7% 
 
77.3% 37.4% 
8 57.4% 18.7% 
 
79.4% 38.4% 
9 58.2% 18.7% 
 
76.7% 37.3% 
10 47.1% 19.0% 
 
73.8% 37.1% 
11-15 55.7% 22.7% 
 
73.7% 40.3% 
16-20 56.5% 25.3% 
 
60.9% 38.1% 
21+ 58.8% 35.9% 
 
n.a. n.a. 
            
      Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys 
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Figure 5: Medicaid Take-Up Rates Among Non-Citizen Adults 
By Number of Years in U.S. 
 
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         Source: 2008-2009 American Community Survey. 
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Table 3A 
Select Weighted Descriptive Statistics 
Core Adult Sample by Language Group 
         
  
Sample 
Size 
Weighted 
Sample Medicaid Age 
<=100% 
FPL 
Family 
Size 
Foreign 
Born 
Non-
citizen 
         Full Sample 59,377 7,755,281 0.37 37.1 0.69 3.7 0.77 0.56 
         Language Group 
        Yiddish, Jewish 529 48,934 0.95 34.1 0.84 6.3 0.18 0.05 
Cantonese 473 54,065 0.74 44.9 0.73 3.8 0.95 0.47 
Armenian 159 21,148 0.68 41.6 0.91 3.6 0.97 0.62 
Bengali 308 38,369 0.67 39.6 0.70 4.4 0.99 0.54 
Miao, Hmong 349 48,810 0.66 35.1 0.69 5.5 0.79 0.41 
Mon-Khmer, 
Cambodian 302 38,935 0.63 40.8 0.60 4.3 0.86 0.40 
Hebrew, Israeli 154 15,853 0.63 36.7 0.83 3.6 0.45 0.16 
Persian 214 26,841 0.57 41.0 0.74 3.7 0.94 0.50 
Arabic 1,093 149,429 0.56 38.2 0.79 4.1 0.86 0.47 
French or 
Haitian Creole 499 70,690 0.54 38.2 0.66 3.5 0.88 0.52 
Vietnamese 1,163 136,242 0.53 41.4 0.66 3.7 0.95 0.40 
Greek 131 15,784 0.53 42.8 0.57 3.2 0.43 0.20 
Russian 872 112,629 0.51 40.6 0.66 3.2 0.92 0.54 
Hungarian 18 1,817 0.49 45.9 0.75 3.3 0.74 0.28 
Italian 294 32,536 0.48 42.9 0.56 2.6 0.36 0.14 
Chinese 1,278 144,500 0.47 42.2 0.66 3.4 0.94 0.54 
Turkish 66 7,796 0.47 36.6 0.46 3.6 0.94 0.66 
Urdu 378 50,734 0.46 41.1 0.61 4.9 0.97 0.44 
Laotian 133 18,353 0.46 37.2 0.60 3.9 0.76 0.43 
Serbo-Croatian 86 10,576 0.46 40.4 0.65 3.1 0.95 0.41 
Mandarin 336 46,106 0.44 41.3 0.70 3.1 0.96 0.69 
Portuguese 821 123,390 0.44 36.8 0.36 2.7 0.88 0.70 
French 771 96,058 0.42 39.4 0.68 2.6 0.55 0.40 
Amharic, 
Ethiopian, etc. 169 23,834 0.41 37.7 0.69 2.8 0.95 0.51 
Ukrainian 187 20,870 0.41 39.4 0.46 4.2 0.95 0.68 
Albanian 84 13,907 0.40 38.0 0.41 4.4 0.92 0.50 
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Tamil, 
Malayalam and 
Telugu 73 8,530 0.37 37.0 0.74 3.7 1.00 0.80 
Hindi and 
Punjabi 440 58,934 0.36 41.4 0.62 3.9 0.96 0.58 
Polish 381 48,052 0.36 41.4 0.49 2.9 0.86 0.54 
Navajo 1,297 96,999 0.35 39.2 0.70 3.8 0.00 0.00 
Filipino, Tagalog 357 42,497 0.35 40.8 0.60 2.9 0.91 0.46 
Kru 237 36,205 0.34 37.4 0.61 3.3 0.94 0.63 
Spanish 43,070 5,817,727 0.33 36.3 0.70 3.8 0.77 0.60 
Rumanian 109 15,779 0.30 36.4 0.66 3.0 0.78 0.38 
German 765 67,996 0.29 37.9 0.60 3.8 0.24 0.12 
Guajarati 158 21,279 0.28 43.1 0.63 3.7 0.97 0.49 
Thai 79 10,296 0.25 39.7 0.79 3.1 0.91 0.60 
Korean 792 96,062 0.22 41.3 0.65 3.0 0.93 0.61 
Japanese 164 20,304 0.21 35.1 0.75 2.0 0.67 0.57 
Dutch 158 13,181 0.14 35.9 0.53 4.8 0.20 0.12 
Pennsylvania 
Dutch 430 33,234 0.05 35.9 0.45 6.6 0.00 0.00 
                  
         Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys 
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Table 3B 
Select Weighted Descriptive Statistics 
Core Children Sample by Language Group 
        
  
 Sample 
Size 
Weighted 
Sample Medicaid/CHIP Age 
<=100% 
FPL 
Foreign 
Born 
Non-
citizen 
        Full Sample 136,542 17,459,492 0.72 8.6 0.51 0.17 0.14 
        Language Group 
       Yiddish, Jewish 1,180 114,830 0.99 7.5 0.72 0.02 0.00 
Hungarian 37 4,333 0.93 11.3 0.48 0.07 0.07 
Miao, Hmong 783 97,823 0.90 10.1 0.57 0.25 0.20 
Hebrew, Israeli 304 29,238 0.89 7.9 0.46 0.10 0.03 
Cantonese 632 67,360 0.89 10.5 0.44 0.26 0.18 
Serbo-Croatian 119 17,853 0.87 8.8 0.35 0.40 0.29 
Albanian 201 30,636 0.86 8.7 0.35 0.31 0.18 
Bengali 466 62,489 0.83 8.1 0.49 0.35 0.17 
Ukrainian 371 37,970 0.82 9.8 0.30 0.52 0.43 
Amharic, 
Ethiopian, etc. 277 33,305 0.82 7.8 0.49 0.33 0.24 
Arabic 2,059 288,215 0.81 8.2 0.60 0.30 0.19 
Armenian 245 33,595 0.81 11.1 0.53 0.39 0.34 
Mandarin 302 36,927 0.81 9.2 0.39 0.31 0.26 
Persian 332 40,672 0.80 9.7 0.49 0.35 0.25 
Polish 364 43,765 0.79 8.8 0.31 0.19 0.13 
French 1,157 133,986 0.79 9.2 0.45 0.17 0.14 
Vietnamese 2,135 228,572 0.77 9.3 0.46 0.22 0.12 
Russian 1,075 122,433 0.76 8.8 0.41 0.41 0.29 
Mon-Khmer, 
Cambodian 478 54,309 0.76 9.9 0.48 0.10 0.07 
Urdu 842 107,877 0.75 8.8 0.47 0.34 0.18 
Kru 490 65,451 0.75 7.2 0.38 0.27 0.20 
Italian 327 33,488 0.74 10.0 0.39 0.10 0.04 
Filipino, Tagalog 958 96,040 0.73 9.1 0.30 0.36 0.25 
Chinese 1,498 161,692 0.73 9.4 0.43 0.27 0.21 
Rumanian 153 21,936 0.72 8.3 0.38 0.17 0.14 
Spanish 109,919 14,468,963 0.72 8.5 0.52 0.16 0.13 
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Laotian 213 28,042 0.71 8.6 0.46 0.09 0.06 
Llocano, Hocano 61 5,295 0.71 10.4 0.22 0.32 0.19 
Greek 138 17,412 0.71 10.0 0.40 0.07 0.02 
Japanese 202 21,979 0.69 8.4 0.34 0.27 0.08 
Turkish 177 19,433 0.68 8.1 0.33 0.49 0.45 
Portuguese 689 93,706 0.66 8.9 0.33 0.31 0.27 
Hindi and 
Punjabi 669 86,987 0.66 8.9 0.33 0.31 0.19 
Navajo 1,056 79,506 0.63 9.9 0.64 0.00 0.00 
Other American 
Indian 337 29,863 0.63 9.4 0.62 0.08 0.07 
Thai 118 14,346 0.62 10.0 0.40 0.32 0.24 
French or 
Haitian Creole 1,572 219,590 0.61 9.0 0.47 0.27 0.22 
Guajarati 213 24,249 0.57 10.0 0.41 0.37 0.30 
Tamil, 
Malayalam and 
Telugu 75 8,786 0.55 9.5 0.53 0.49 0.44 
Korean 1,173 128,283 0.48 9.9 0.36 0.38 0.34 
German 1,617 135,941 0.39 8.8 0.48 0.09 0.05 
Dutch 406 28,403 0.18 7.7 0.44 0.03 0.01 
Pennsylvania 
Dutch 1,122 83,913 0.09 7.9 0.39 0.00 0.00 
                
        Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys 
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Table 4A 
Contact Availability Variable 
Core Adult Model 
 
          Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
       Log Transformed Contact Availability 
    PUMA level 
 
59377 0.89 1.56 -4.18 6.37 
Super-PUMA level 
 
59377 0.64 1.38 -4.78 5.49 
MSA level 
 
57119 0.41 1.05 -4.40 5.46 
       Sensitivity Specifications 
      No Denominator 
 
59377 -2.42 1.66 -10.02 -0.11 
No Log Transformation 
 
59377 16.89 71.85 0.02 583.30 
No Denominator, No Log 
Transformation 
 
59377 0.20 0.20 0.000 0.89 
             
       Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys 
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Table 4B 
Contact Availability Variable 
Core Child Model 
 
          Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
       Log Transformed Contact Availability 
    PUMA level 
 
136,542 0.97 1.30 -5.76 6.34 
Super-PUMA level 
 
136,542 0.75 1.17 -4.43 5.48 
MSA level 
 
132,390 0.56 0.97 -5.83 5.52 
       Sensitivity Specifications 
      No Denominator 
 
136,542 -1.88 1.53 -11.50 -0.06 
No Log Transformation 
 
136,542 10.88 49.40 0.00 565.92 
No Denominator, No Log 
Transformation 
 
136,542 0.30 0.26 0.000 0.94 
       Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys 
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Table 5 
Tabulation of State Variable 
Core Adult and Child Samples 
         
  
Adults 
 
Children 
  
Sample 
Size 
Weighted 
Sample 
Size % 
 
Sample 
Size 
Weighted 
Sample 
Size % 
         Total 
 
59,377 7,755,281 100.0 
 
136,542 17,459,492 100.0 
         Alabama 
 
33 3,130 0.0 
 
534 71,824 0.4 
Alaska 
 
13 1,366 0.0 
 
84 10,097 0.1 
Arizona 
 
3,786 468,646 6.0 
 
5,283 700,221 4.0 
Arkansas 
 
637 81,116 1.1 
 
694 88,950 0.5 
California 
 
11,733 1,392,424 18.0 
 
38,492 4,656,373 26.7 
Colorado 
 
311 49,680 0.6 
 
1,840 271,326 1.6 
Connecticut 
 
1,919 259,209 3.3 
 
1,342 170,668 1.0 
Delaware 
 
158 20,095 0.3 
 
186 25,177 0.1 
DC 
 
124 14,935 0.2 
 
77 8,690 0.1 
Florida 
 
972 120,258 1.6 
 
8,528 1,069,004 6.1 
Georgia 
 
331 44,838 0.6 
 
3,157 439,133 2.5 
Hawaii 
 
230 26,244 0.3 
 
205 19,411 0.1 
Idaho 
 
468 57,342 0.7 
 
508 56,741 0.3 
Illinois 
 
2,748 416,365 5.4 
 
4,467 657,816 3.8 
Indiana 
 
1,378 171,106 2.2 
 
1,431 164,771 0.9 
Iowa 
 
415 62,897 0.8 
 
363 51,095 0.3 
Kansas 
 
28 5,754 0.1 
 
709 98,186 0.6 
Kentucky 
 
84 11,193 0.1 
 
448 49,720 0.3 
Louisiana 
 
25 4,051 0.1 
 
570 67,805 0.4 
Maine 
 
188 22,022 0.3 
 
87 8,230 0.1 
Maryland 
 
742 95,353 1.2 
 
1,277 163,262 0.9 
Massachusetts 3,428 468,042 6.0 
 
2,221 289,504 1.7 
Michigan 
 
606 81,500 1.1 
 
1,536 194,355 1.1 
Minnesota 
 
916 151,952 2.0 
 
801 124,329 0.7 
Mississippi 
 
24 2,839 0.0 
 
271 32,755 0.2 
Missouri 
 
50 6,894 0.1 
 
876 98,478 0.6 
Montana 
 
6 917 0.0 
 
59 6,975 0.0 
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Nebraska 
 
37 6,642 0.1 
 
347 58,783 0.3 
Nevada 
 
940 124,912 1.6 
 
1,343 179,207 1.0 
New Hampshire 9 1,635 0.0 
 
95 14,843 0.1 
New Jersey 
 
2,246 284,600 3.7 
 
3,905 504,103 2.9 
New Mexico 
 
2,906 339,975 4.4 
 
1,978 235,619 1.4 
New York 
 
9,280 1,261,785 16.3 
 
10,828 1,460,670 8.4 
North Carolina 237 29,621 0.4 
 
2,674 361,723 2.1 
North Dakota 
 
0 0 0.0 
 
30 4,639 0.0 
Ohio 
 
342 44,578 0.6 
 
1,275 146,795 0.8 
Oklahoma 
 
990 140,012 1.8 
 
851 111,465 0.6 
Oregon 
 
1,443 205,470 2.7 
 
1,383 197,752 1.1 
Pennsylvania 
 
2,693 360,867 4.7 
 
2,551 326,039 1.9 
Rhode Island 
 
239 32,886 0.4 
 
451 56,755 0.3 
South Carolina 209 25,001 0.3 
 
771 96,769 0.6 
South Dakota 
 
6 1,340 0.0 
 
49 7,408 0.0 
Tennessee 
 
844 105,181 1.4 
 
1,044 136,268 0.8 
Texas 
 
1,223 159,235 2.1 
 
25,101 3,218,383 18.4 
Utah 
 
662 94,799 1.2 
 
758 104,970 0.6 
Vermont 
 
57 6,638 0.1 
 
49 6,635 0.0 
Virginia 
 
62 8,787 0.1 
 
1,071 146,808 0.8 
Washington 
 
2,552 328,889 4.2 
 
2,850 348,625 2.0 
West Virginia 
 
4 404 0.0 
 
53 5,386 0.0 
Wisconsin 
 
1,038 151,417 2.0 
 
980 128,258 0.7 
Wyoming 
 
5 439 0.0 
 
59 6,693 0.0 
                
                  
Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
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Appendix 1A 
Descriptive Statistics 
Expanded Adult Sample, by Health Insurance Status 
            
  
Employer 
Sponsored 
Insurance 
Private 
Non-
Group Medicaid Uninsured 
      Unweighted N 
 
19,008 5,521 22,980 36,397 
      Weighted N 
 
2,375,098 655,714 2,843,547 4,911,734 
      Foreign born 
 
70.7% 73.7% 69.0% 81.9% 
      Fluent in English 
 
74.1% 77.6% 62.1% 49.7% 
      Non-Citizen 
 
40.9% 46.8% 36.1% 67.6% 
      MSA Status 
     Non-MSA 
 
9.5% 8.6% 6.9% 10.7% 
MSA not identifiable 
 
4.5% 4.1% 2.5% 3.7% 
MSA, central city 
 
28.4% 36.7% 43.7% 27.3% 
MSA, outside central city 
 
27.9% 24.6% 21.4% 26.1% 
MSA, central city status 
unknown 29.8% 26.0% 25.6% 32.1% 
      Female 
 
52.4% 53.9% 65.0% 49.8% 
      Age 
     Age, 19-24 
 
16.9% 28.3% 13.2% 14.7% 
Age, 25-34 
 
26.1% 22.9% 26.4% 34.4% 
Age, 35-44 
 
31.1% 20.8% 27.6% 29.3% 
Age, 45-54 
 
17.7% 16.7% 20.1% 14.9% 
Age, 55-64 
 
8.1% 11.4% 12.8% 6.7% 
      Education 
     < High school 
 
28.4% 19.9% 46.6% 52.0% 
High school graduate 
 
26.8% 19.6% 26.8% 26.2% 
Some college 
 
27.8% 32.0% 20.1% 14.7% 
College+ 
 
17.0% 28.5% 6.5% 7.1% 
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Race and Ethnicity 
     White, non-Hispanic 
 
20.2% 27.2% 15.7% 10.3% 
Black, non-Hispanic 
 
5.1% 4.4% 4.5% 2.8% 
Asian, non-Hispanic 
 
17.5% 35.4% 13.3% 8.7% 
Hispanic 
 
55.1% 31.2% 63.6% 75.9% 
Other and multiple races 
 
2.1% 1.8% 2.9% 2.3% 
      Married 
 
55.4% 42.5% 45.8% 53.7% 
      Family size 
 
3.6 2.7 3.8 3.7 
      Number of own children in 
family 1.6 1.0 1.7 1.6 
      Income Relative to Poverty 
     <=100% FPL 
 
38.1% 66.3% 74.5% 65.3% 
101-200% FPL 
 
47.5% 27.7% 22.4% 31.5% 
201-300% FPL 
 
14.4% 5.9% 3.1% 3.2% 
      Has Welfare Income 
 
1.3% 2.3% 14.5% 2.0% 
      Number of disabilities 
 
0.11 0.15 0.46 0.10 
      Year 2009 
 
49.5% 51.1% 54.6% 52.9% 
      Work Status 
     Worker, not self-
employed 
 
81.7% 59.5% 55.9% 64.2% 
Worker, self-employed 
 
4.2% 12.1% 6.8% 10.1% 
Non-worker 
 
14.2% 28.4% 37.3% 25.7% 
           
      Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys 
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Appendix 1B 
Descriptive Statistics 
Expanded Child Sample, by Health Insurance Status 
            
  
Employer 
Sponsored 
Insurance 
Private 
Non-
Group Medicaid 
Uninsure
d 
      Unweighted N 
 
46,064 9,808 98,348 38,194 
      
Weighted N 
 
5,500,313 1,087,958 
12,497,18
1 4,962,311 
      Foreign born 
 
12.8% 21.0% 11.0% 33.2% 
      Fluent in English 
 
73.8% 74.1% 62.6% 72.5% 
      Non-Citizen 
 
8.2% 15.8% 7.7% 30.1% 
      MSA Status 
     Non-MSA 
 
7.4% 6.7% 7.5% 10.3% 
MSA not identifiable 
 
2.6% 2.2% 2.3% 3.3% 
MSA, central city 
 
25.2% 27.9% 30.0% 19.7% 
MSA, outside central city 
 
35.0% 33.6% 26.9% 30.0% 
MSA, central city status 
unknown 29.8% 29.6% 33.4% 36.8% 
      Female 
 
48.9% 49.6% 49.0% 48.2% 
      Age 
     Infant 
 
4.2% 3.9% 6.6% 2.7% 
Age, 1-5 
 
24.0% 22.1% 32.1% 20.2% 
Age, 6-19 
 
71.8% 74.1% 61.3% 77.1% 
      Number Family Members with 
At Least Some College 
     0 
 
41.4% 43.7% 65.9% 66.9% 
1 
 
33.7% 33.4% 24.7% 22.6% 
2+ 
 
24.9% 23.0% 9.5% 10.5% 
      Race and Ethnicity 
     White, non-Hispanic 
 
16.9% 20.0% 8.7% 9.4% 
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Black, non-Hispanic 
 
5.7% 4.0% 3.5% 3.1% 
Asian, non-Hispanic 
 
12.4% 20.6% 6.6% 6.1% 
Hispanic 
 
62.2% 52.5% 79.4% 79.7% 
Other and multiple races 
 
2.8% 2.9% 1.8% 1.7% 
      Family size 
 
4.71 4.34 4.96 4.94 
      Two-Parent Family 
 
71.5% 67.3% 63.3% 69.4% 
      Income Relative to Poverty 
     <=100% FPL 
 
19.4% 34.3% 53.7% 43.8% 
101-200% FPL 
 
50.9% 46.2% 39.3% 48.2% 
201-300% FPL 
 
25.0% 16.8% 6.4% 7.5% 
301%+ 
 
4.7% 2.6% 0.5% 0.6% 
      Number of Workers in Family 
     0 
 
2.7% 7.6% 7.9% 5.1% 
1 
 
39.8% 42.1% 45.7% 41.9% 
2+ 
 
57.6% 50.3% 46.5% 53.0% 
      Number of disabilities 
 
0.039 0.043 0.067 0.028 
      Year 2009 
 
48.9% 49.5% 54.0% 49.0% 
           
      Source: 2008-2009 American Community Surveys 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Summarizing Research Objectives 
 This dissertation explores how group behavior influences individual economic 
decision-making in the context of health insurance choice.  Broadly speaking, any paper 
that analyzes group behavior effects (e.g., network effects, peer effects, social 
interactions) ought to address four key areas.   First, the study must define a relevant or 
interesting economic outcome.   Medicaid take-up rates are below 100% and there is 
considerable uncertainty over why this is the case.  This study provides insight into why 
some groups have lower take-up rates than others.  In addition, the Medicaid take-up 
process is complicated (e.g. eligibility pathways that vary by income, age, and 
geographic location) and there is uncertainty over the benefits that certain populations 
might face (e.g., variation in covered benefits, payment rates, quality of care, access, 
etc…).  Such an uncertain environment is conducive to non-market interactions among 
social contacts and is an interesting study for measure group effects 
 Second, the study must define the each individual’s group as precisely as 
possible.  Some studies, such as those that look at peer effects in high school cohorts or 
roommate effects in college, use rich data to precisely measure group behavior effects 
and social interactions.  One major limitation of this study is that I do not have available 
data at this precise of a level.  In contrast, I define each individual’s group of potential 
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contacts by using non-English language spoken at home and geographic PUMA of 
residence.  Given this assumption, careful consideration is needed to determine how 
these groups operate and why they serve as a good proxy for the social interactions 
between individuals. 
 Third, the study ought to determine how the defined group can influence 
individual behavior.  For this study, I chose language groups because previous 
sociological and economic studies show that persons who speak a non-English language 
at home interact mainly with others who speak that language.  It is also likely that these 
individuals, especially the foreign born population, are less likely to have specific capital 
about the U.S health care system (relative to their English-speaking counterparts) and 
are more likely to rely on their language group for information related to Medicaid.  
While PUMAs are not the most precise geographic measures, they are the most detailed 
than anything available in comparable surveys, such as the CPS and MEPS.  I also 
develop an economic model that shows how group behavior alters the individual’s 
expected utility between taking-up Medicaid and being uninsured.  This model shows 
how each person receives information through the available contacts in each person’s 
local area.  However, one limitation of this model is that it does not predict the specific 
type of information that language groups transfer.  For example, groups can pass along 
information related to the existence or eligibility rules associated with Medicaid, and/or 
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they can pass along information related to the relative benefits of Medicaid compared 
to being uninsured. 
 Finally, and most importantly, the study must empirically identify the causal 
effect of group behavior on individual outcomes.  The empirical framework for this 
study is well-established (Bertrand et al. 2000; Deri 2005) and utilizes several important 
components.  First, the left-hand side (LHS) variable in the core model is a 0-1 indicator 
for having Medicaid vs. being uninsured.  I also use an expanded sample that includes 
those with private health insurance and define the LHS variable as a 0-1 indicator for 
having any insurance.  Second, the main right-hand side variable interest is an 
interaction term between two continuous variables:   
(1) The Medicaid take-up rate of the individual’s language group.  For the core 
model, for each individual, this variable is defined as number of persons in their 
common language group that are enrolled in Medicaid divided by the number of 
persons in the common language group that are either enrolled in Medicaid or 
are eligible for Medicaid but are uninsured .  This is a standard definition of 
Medicaid take-up or participation.  The concept being this variable is that it 
serves as a proxy for language group quality:  language groups with higher take-
up rates possess more knowledge or information related to Medicaid coverage 
or have a higher valuation of Medicaid relative to being uninsured.   
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(2)  The proportion of the person’s local area that are part of the person’s common 
language group.  This variable serves as a proxy the contact availability for each 
person.  This variable captures the geographic component of group behavior.   
 What exactly does this interaction term mean?  Intuitively, for an individual that 
is part of a high Medicaid/CHIP take-up language group (e.g., above the mean), living 
among a high concentration of his/her language group can increase the person’s 
probability of taking-up Medicaid.  For example, these potential contacts can provide 
information related to the benefits of enrollment relative to being uninsured.   In 
contrast, for those that are part of a low take-up group (e.g., below the mean), living 
among a high concentration of the language group can decrease the person’s 
probability of taking-up Medicaid.  These potential contacts might believe that costs of 
enrollment outweigh the benefits (e.g., it is more convenient to remain uninsured and 
utilize necessary care from safety net providers), and could discourage the individual 
from enrolling.  It is also possible that living among a high concentration of the language 
group can increase the probability of take-up, regardless if the person is from a low or 
high take-up group.  However, the differential effect on the probability of take-up will 
be larger among those that are part of a high take-up group, as these groups might 
possess more practical knowledge (e.g., information related to eligibility and necessary 
documentation) that could help the individual enroll in Medicaid.  In other words, this 
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study analyzes the differential effect of living in areas of high concentration of a 
common language group on an individual’s probability of taking-up Medicaid. 
 One of the main advantages of the interaction term is that the model can include 
dummy variables for each language group and for each PUMA (fixed effects), controlling 
for omitted language group and local area characteristics that could be correlated with 
main variable of interest.  The model also allows the researcher to directly control for 
the contact availability for each individual. The “naïve” regression results in Chapter 5 
show that models that fail to control for local area or language group characteristics will 
create group behavior coefficients that are biased upwards.  However, it is possible that 
there are some remaining omitted variables that are correlated with the interaction 
term.  For example, there is potential for differential geographic sorting, where people 
who live in areas of high concentration of their language group are different in some 
unobservable way from people who live in low concentration areas, but in a way that is 
correlated with Medicaid take-up (e.g., sorting based on health status).  It is also 
possible omitted outreach effects that are not captured by the language group and local 
are dummies, could partially explain the results.  For example, it is high concentrations 
of a Medicaid/CHIP utilizing language group in a local area could cause a school district 
or a Medicaid/CHIP office to implement policies that increase ease of enrollment.  This 
effect would be capture by the network variable in the main model.  Various sensitivity 
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models in Chapter 5 address these concerns, and the main results are summarized 
below.   
 
Main Empirical Results 
 For both adults and children, I find positive and statistically significant 
coefficients on the main variable of interest across multiple model specifications and 
sample restrictions.  For the core sample, which is limited to Medicaid/CHIP eligibles 
without private health insurance, the coefficient on the network/group variable is .100 
among the adult sample and .071 among the child sample, both of which are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  When those with private coverage are included in the 
sample (and the dependent variable is a 0-1 indicator for any coverage), the coefficients 
for the adult and child sample are .118 and .100, respectively, and remain statistically 
significant at the 1% level.   
 However, these coefficients by themselves are difficult to interpret due to the 
fact that the independent variable is an interaction between two continuous variables.  
Interpreting this variable as a policy multiplier, as described in Chapter 4, I find that for a 
hypothetical policy that  increases Medicaid use by 1 percentage point, the network for 
these language groups will increase the probability of taking-up Medicaid by 9.9 
percentage points for adults and 7.4 percentage points for children  (averaged across all 
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language groups). These multipliers are slightly larger (11.0 and 10.4 percentage points 
for adults and children, respectively) among the expanded sample. 
 The results from various models also indicate that these effects cannot be 
completely driven by alternative hypotheses driven by omitted variable biases.  There 
are two main omitted variable biases to be concerned about.  The first is differential 
geographic sorting, where people who live in areas of concentrations of their language 
group are different in some unobservable way from people who live in low 
concentration areas, but in a way that is correlated with Medicaid take-up.  For 
example, suppose a recent immigrant that is part of a high take-up language group 
initially lives among in a high CA area.  However, over time, this person’s beliefs related 
to Medicaid change, and he/she moves away from this high CA area and behaves 
differently from the rest of the language group.  In this model, this person would not 
have Medicaid, lives in a low CA area, and is part of a high take-up group.  The network 
coefficient would be upward bias because it would assume that this person does not 
have Medicaid because he/she is in a low take-up area. Another example could be 
related how people could sort based on their health or disability status, where 
unobservable health characteristics of the individual create an upward bias on the 
network variable. 
 There are several results that provide evidence against these biases.  First, this 
paper finds small differences across models when defining contact availability at the 
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large super-PUMA or MSA levels.  If geographic sorting were driving the results, we 
would expect to see more drastic differences across the models.  Second, the results in 
tables 8A and 8B show that the language-geography group effect is stronger among 
recent immigrants compared to those that have been in the country for a longer period 
of time.  I also find that the network variable remains positive and statistically significant 
even after controlling for years since entry in the U.S. and interaction terms between 
language group and years since entry, and when I limit the sample to those that have 
lived in the same house for the past year.  I do not find evidence in favor of selection 
based on health status.  I find that the network variable is statistically insignificant when 
limited to the portion of the sample that has at least one ACS-defined disability or 
limitation. 
 The second omitted variable bias concern is related to unobservable outreach 
efforts that are correlated with language and geography.  This bias could partially 
explain some of the child sample results, but not the adult sample results.  However, I 
find that network effects remain statistically significant after I exclude observations two 
states (CA and NY) that have well known outreach programs, and when I exclude states 
that do not have Medicaid outreach programs, targeted toward pregnant women, in 
foreign languages.   I also address this concern by limiting the sample to Spanish 
speakers only and defining networks based on country of birth.  If outreach works in 
manner that is correlated with language but not country of birth, the results from these 
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models would only capture a potential country of birth network effect, but not an 
outreach effect.  For adults, I find that the country of birth network variable is 
statistically significant at the 1% level and consistent in magnitude with the language 
network variable.  However, I find statistically insignificant results among the Spanish-
only child sample when defining networks based on the mother’s country of birth.  
However, this result could just be attributable to the fact that a mother’s country of 
birth is a weak measure of networks compared to language spoken at home.   
 The results from this study are also consistent with the hypothesis that networks 
operate through the spread of information.  I find that language-geography defined 
group effects are strongest among the foreign born population and recent immigrants, 
whom are more likely to rely on social contacts to obtain information related to the U.S. 
health care system.  I also find evidence that group effects are generally stronger in 
smaller geographic areas, where there could be more opportunities to run into potential 
contacts as opposed larger, sparsely population areas.  Interestingly, I find that the 
effects are stronger among adults in linguistically isolated household, but that the 
opposite is true among children in linguistically isolated households.   
 Finally, I find that the results are relatively insensitive to various sample and 
model specification tests.  I find that 
 Language-geography group effects remain statistically significant even when 
excluding Spanish speakers and outlier language groups; 
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 Group effects are insensitive to the choice of including or excluding non-citizens, 
whether or not I include immigrants who might be ineligible for Medicaid/CHIP 
because they have been in the U.S. for under 5 years.  Excluding non-citizens 
decreases the magnitude of the effect, but the results remain significant at the 
1% level; 
 The results are consistent across both core and expanded samples; 
 The results are consistent across various definitions of Medicaid eligibility, 
language group take-up, contact availability; 
 The results are consistent across the use of linear OLS and non-linear models, 
such as logits, probits, and multinomial logits.  
 
Policy Implications 
 The main results from this paper have so far been interpreted through the broad 
lens of a policy multiplier effect: compared to a world without the existence of non-
market interactions, on average, the presence of language-geography defined groups 
can increase the responsiveness to policies that aim to increase Medicaid take-up.  
However, one major limitation of this study is that the coefficient of interest can only be 
interpreted in terms of an average across all language groups; state policymakers must 
know the details of the populations that they are dealing with, in terms of the 
composition of language groups, where they generally live, and how the generally 
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behave, in order to full realize the distributional effects of policy changes.  The presence 
of group effects might make it easier to reach out to certain language groups with 
average to above-average take-up rates, but policymakers might face resistance among 
the low take-up language groups as a whole. 
 The results from this study could assist State and local policymakers that are 
looking for ways to spend the $100 million of approved CHIPRA outreach and 
enrollment funds.  In order to maximize take-up among non-English speakers, the low 
hanging fruit for policymakers lies with the uninsured that are part of “moderate” to 
“high” take-up language groups.  Policymakers might achieve “more bang-for-your-
buck” with outreach efforts among this population. The results in Table 20 indicate that 
network effects are stronger among those in the top distribution of language take-up 
groups.  As such, the message associated with outreach could be able to spread more 
quickly and efficiently among these groups.    
 Second, the eligible uninsured population that are part of low take-up language 
groups are more complicated, and there are different policy tools are needed to reach 
these populations depending on their characteristics.  If state and local officials are 
convinced that these individuals are uninsured because they lack information related to 
Medicaid eligibility and enrollment procedures, improved outreach efforts can be use to 
provide practical information in terms of how and where to obtain coverage.  However, 
low language group take-up rates might not be due to lack of practical information.  It is 
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possible that individuals that are part of these groups know about Medicaid eligibility 
rules, but decided that it’s not worth the time and hassle costs to enroll.  For these 
groups, simple outreach efforts may prove to be futile; policy-makers should focus on 
improving the value of Medicaid relative to being uninsured, either by decreasing the 
costs of enrollment (e.g., setting up more automatic processes) or increasing the 
benefits of coverage (e.g., improving the quality of care or increasing the network of 
providers that accept Medicaid patients).   
 Third, policymakers might want to target residents in low CA areas in order to 
maximize social welfare.  People in high CA areas might have better informal insurance 
networks and information compared to those who are not surrounded by a high 
concentration of their language group.   As such, outreach dollars could be used to 
enroll those uninsured who are in hard-to-reach places.  
 Finally, the results from this paper can be used to understand the newly eligible 
Medicaid population and analyze compliance patterns related to the individual mandate 
under the ACA.  The ACA expands Medicaid eligibility to most adults under 138% of the 
federal poverty level.  ACS data can be used to determine which language groups will be 
most affected by this expansion, and the results from this paper can be used to 
understand why newly eligible individuals from certain language groups are or are not 
enrolling in Medicaid.  The results from this study could also shed some light on the 
behavior of non-English speakers between 138 and 400% of the FPL who could 
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potentially participate in the health insurance Exchange.  This paper supports the idea 
that individuals obtain information from others who are part of the same language 
group, regardless of their socio-economic status (contact availability is defined over the 
entire population).  Moving forward, the patterns that we see with the Medicaid-eligible 
populations could be similar to the patterns that will emerge among those who are 
eligible for premium and cost-sharing subsidies in the Exchange.  While overall take-up 
of Exchange benefits could be higher (most of these individuals must comply with the 
individual mandate or face a penalty and the quality of private coverage will most likely 
be higher) the distribution of of Exchange take-up could be similar to what we see 
among current Medicaid-eligible language groups. 
 There are some obvious limitations to this study that could hinder policymaker’s 
ability to interpret or fully utilize these results.  First, and most obviously, these results 
have little insight into the behavior of English speakers who are eligible for Medicaid 
benefits.  Future research and data sources are needed to determine which networks 
(e.g., church participation) play an important role in influencing health insurance 
behavior for the majority of the population.  Second, the coefficient on the main 
variable of interest is an average across all language groups, making it challenging to 
apply the same uniform information to all non-English language groups.  It is also likely 
that the network mechanism (e.g., information related to product search vs. 
information related to product value) varies across different language groups.  Third, the 
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ACS only captures point-in-time enrollment in Medicaid.  Additional research can 
provide insight into how previous encounters with the Medicaid system influence the 
quality of information flowing through language-geography groups.  Finally, this study 
only used age, income, and state or residence to determine Medicaid/CHIP eligibility; in 
reality, eligibility is more complicated.  Future research will use a more precise eligibility 
simulation/imputation model to determine which populations might actually be eligible 
but were excluded from the sample (e.g., the disabled or medically needy) and which 
populations are not eligible but were included in the sample, such as undocumented 
immigrants.   
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